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Abstract
This paper studies game-type credit default swaps that allow the protection buyer and seller to raise
or reduce their respective positions once prior to default. This leads to the study of an optimal stopping
game subject to early default termination. Under a structural credit risk model based on spectrally negative
Le´vy processes, we apply the principles of smooth and continuous fit to identify the equilibrium exercise
strategies for the buyer and the seller. We then rigorously prove the existence of the Nash equilibrium and
compute the contract value at equilibrium. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the impacts of
default risk and other contractual features on the players’ exercise timing at equilibrium.
c⃝ 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Credit default swaps (CDSs) are among the most liquid and widely used credit derivatives
for trading and managing default risks. Under a vanilla CDS contract, the protection buyer pays
a periodic premium to the protection seller in exchange for a payment if the reference entity
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defaults before expiration. In order to control the credit risk exposure, investors can adjust
the premium and notional amount prior to default by appropriately combining a market-traded
default swaption with a vanilla CDS position, or use the over-the-counter traded products such
as the callable CDSs (see [9, Chapter 21]). In a recent related work [27], we studied the optimal
timing to step up or down a CDS position under a general Le´vy credit risk model.
The current paper studies the game-type CDSs that allow both the protection buyer and seller
to change the swap position once prior to default. Specifically, in the step-up (resp. step-down)
default swap game, as soon as the buyer or the seller, whoever first, exercises prior to default, the
notional amount and premium will be increased (resp. decreased) to a pre-specified level upon
exercise. From the exercise time till default, the buyer will pay the new premium and the seller
is subject to the new default liability. Hence, for a given set of contract parameters, the buyer’s
objective is to maximize the expected net cash flow while the seller wants to minimize it, giving
rise to a two-player optimal stopping game.
We model the default time as the first passage time of a general exponential Le´vy process
representing some underlying asset value. The default event occurs either when the underlying
asset value moves continuously to the lower default barrier, or when it jumps below the default
barrier. This is an extension of the original structural credit risk approach introduced by Black
and Cox [8] where the asset value follows a geometric Brownian motion. As is well known [13],
the incorporation of unpredictable jump-to-default is useful for explaining a number of market
observations, such as the non-zero short-term limit of credit spreads. Other related credit risk
models based on Le´vy and other jump processes include [10,19,34].
The default swap game is formulated as a variation of the standard optimal stopping games in
the literature (see, among others, [14,17] and references therein). However, while typical optimal
stopping games end at the time of exercise by either player, the exercise time in the default
swap game does not terminate the contract, but merely alters the premium forward and the future
protection amount to be paid at default time. In fact, since default may arrive before either party
exercises, the game may be terminated early involuntarily.
The central challenge of the default swap games lies in determining the pair of stopping times
that yield the Nash equilibrium. Under a structural credit risk model based on spectrally negative
Le´vy processes, we analyze and calculate the equilibrium exercise strategies for the protection
buyer and seller. In addition, we determine the equilibrium premium of the default swap game
so that the expected discounted cash flows for the two parties coincide at contract inception.
Our solution approach starts with a decomposition of the default swap game into a
combination of a perpetual CDS and an optimal stopping game with early termination from
default. Moreover, we utilize a symmetry between the step-up and step-down games, which
significantly simplifies our analysis as it is sufficient to study either case. For a general spectrally
negative Le´vy process (with a non-atomic Le´vy measure), we provide the conditions for
the existence of the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we derive the buyer’s and seller’s optimal
threshold-type exercise strategies using the principle of continuous and smooth fit, followed by
a rigorous verification theorem via martingale arguments.
For our analysis of the game equilibrium, the scale function and a number of fluctuation
identities of spectrally negative Le´vy processes are particularly useful. Using our analytic results,
we provide a bisection-based algorithm for the efficient computation of the buyer’s and seller’s
exercise thresholds as well as the equilibrium premium, illustrated in a series of numerical
examples. Other recent applications of spectrally negative Le´vy processes include derivative
pricing [1,2], optimal dividend problem [3,24,29], and capital reinforcement timing [16]. We
refer the reader to [23] for a comprehensive account.
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To our best knowledge, the step-up and step-down default swap games and the associated
optimal stopping games have not been studied elsewhere. There are a few related studies on
stochastic games driven by spectrally negative or positive Le´vy processes; see e.g. [4,5]. For
optimal stopping games driven by a strong Markov process, we refer to the recent papers
by [17,31], which study the existence and mathematical characterization of Nash equilibrium.
Other game-type derivatives in the literature include Israeli/game options [21,22], defaultable
game options [6], and convertible bonds [20,33].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the default swap game
under a general Le´vy model. In Section 3, we focus on the spectrally negative Le´vy model and
analyze the Nash equilibrium. Section 4 provides the numerical study of the default swap games
for the case with i.i.d. exponential jumps. Section 5 concludes the paper and presents some ideas
for future work. All proofs are given in the Appendix.
2. Game formulation
On a complete probability space (Ω ,F ,P), we assume there exists a Le´vy process X = {X t ;
t ≥ 0} and denote by F = (Ft )t≥0 the filtration generated by X . The value of the reference entity
(a company stock or other assets) is assumed to evolve according to an exponential Le´vy process
St = eX t , t ≥ 0. Following the Black–Cox [8] structural approach, the default event is triggered
by S crossing a lower level D. Without loss of generality, we can take log D = 0 by shifting the
initial value x ∈ R. Henceforth, we shall work with the default time
σ0 := inf{t ≥ 0 : X t ≤ 0},
where inf ∅ = ∞ by convention. We denote by Px the probability law and Ex the expectation
with X0 = x .
We consider a default swap contract that gives the protection buyer and seller an option
to change the premium and notional amount before default for a fee, whoever exercises first.
Specifically, the buyer begins by paying premium at rate p over time for a notional amount α to
be paid at default. Prior to default, the buyer and the seller can select a time to switch to a new
premium pˆ and notional amount αˆ. When the buyer exercises, she is incurred the fee γb to be
paid to the seller; when the seller exercises, she is incurred γs to be paid to the buyer. If the buyer
and the seller exercise simultaneously, then both parties pay the fee upon exercise. We assume
that p, pˆ, α, αˆ, γb, γs ≥ 0 (see also Remark 2.2 below).
Let S := {τ ∈ F : τ ≤ σ0 a.s. } be the set of all stopping times smaller than or equal to the
default time. Denote the buyer’s candidate exercise time by τ ∈ S and seller’s candidate exercise
time by σ ∈ S, and let r > 0 be the positive risk-free interest rate. Given any pair of exercise
times (σ, τ ), the expected cash flow to the buyer is given by
V (x; σ, τ) := Ex

−
 τ∧σ
0
e−r t p dt + 1{τ∧σ<∞}

−
 σ0
τ∧σ
e−r t pˆ dt
+ e−rσ0(αˆ1{τ∧σ<σ0} + α1{τ∧σ=σ0})
+ 1{τ∧σ<σ0}e−r(τ∧σ)
−γb1{τ≤σ } + γs1{τ≥σ } . (2.1)
To the seller, the contract value is −V (x; σ, τ). Naturally, the buyer wants to maximize V over
τ whereas the seller wants to minimize V over σ , giving rise to a two-player optimal stopping
game.
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This formulation covers default swap games with the following provisions:
(1) Step-up Game: if pˆ > p and αˆ > α, then the buyer and the seller are allowed to increase the
notional amount once from α to αˆ and the premium rate from p to pˆ by paying the fee γb (if
the buyer exercises) or γs (if the seller exercises).
(2) Step-down Game: if pˆ < p and αˆ < α, then the buyer and the seller are allowed to decrease
the notional amount once from α to αˆ and the premium rate from p to pˆ by paying the fee
γb (if the buyer exercises) or γs (if the seller exercises). When pˆ = αˆ = 0, we obtain a
cancellation game which allows the buyer and the seller to terminate the contract early.
Our primary objective is to determine the pair of stopping times (σ ∗, τ ∗) ⊂ S, called the
saddle point, that constitutes the Nash equilibrium:
V (x; σ ∗, τ ) ≤ V (x; σ ∗, τ ∗) ≤ V (x; σ, τ ∗), ∀ σ, τ ∈ S. (2.2)
Remark 2.1. A related concept is the Stackelberg equilibrium, represented by the equality
V ∗(x) = V∗(x), where V ∗(x) := infσ∈S supτ∈S V (x; σ, τ) and V∗(x) := supτ∈S infσ∈S V (x;
σ, τ). See e.g. [17,31]. These definitions imply that V ∗(x) ≥ V∗(x). The existence of the Nash
equilibrium (2.2) will also yield the Stackelberg equilibrium via the reverse inequality:
V ∗(x) ≤ sup
τ∈S
V (x; σ ∗, τ ) ≤ V (x; σ ∗, τ ∗) ≤ inf
σ∈S
V (x; σ, τ ∗) ≤ V∗(x).
Herein, we shall focus our analysis on the Nash equilibrium.
Our main results on the Nash equilibrium are summarized in Theorems 3.1–3.2 for the spec-
trally negative Le´vy case. As preparation, we begin our analysis with two useful observations,
namely, the decomposition of V and the symmetry between the step-up and step-down games.
2.1. Decomposition and symmetry
In standard optimal stopping games, such as the well-known Dynkin game [14], random pay-
offs are realized at either player’s exercise time. However, our default swap game is not termi-
nated at the buyer’s or seller’s exercise time. In fact, upon exercise only the contract terms will
change, and there will be a terminal transaction at default time. Since default may arrive before
either party exercises the step-up/down option, the game may be terminated early involuntarily.
Therefore, we shall transform the value function V into another optimal stopping game that is
more amenable for analysis.
First, we define the value of a (perpetual) CDS with premium rate p and notional amount α
by
C(x; p, α) := Ex

−
 σ0
0
e−r t p dt + α e−rσ0

=
 p
r
+ α

ζ(x)− p
r
, x > 0, (2.3)
where
ζ(x) := Ex e−rσ0 , x ∈ R, (2.4)
is the Laplace transform of σ0. Next, we extract this CDS value from the value function V . Let
α˜ := α − αˆ and p˜ := p − pˆ. (2.5)
Proposition 2.1 (Decomposition). For every σ, τ ∈ S and x > 0, the value function admits the
decomposition
V (x; σ, τ) = C(x; p, α)+ v(x; σ, τ),
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where v(x; σ, τ) ≡ v(x; σ, τ ; p˜, α˜, γb, γs) is defined by
v(x; σ, τ ; p˜, α˜, γb, γs)
:= Ex

e−r(τ∧σ)

h(Xτ )1{τ<σ } + g(Xσ )1{τ>σ } + f (Xτ )1{τ=σ }

1{τ∧σ<∞}

, (2.6)
with
h(x) ≡ h(x; p˜, α˜, γb) := 1{x>0}
 p˜
r
− γb

−
 p˜
r
+ α˜

ζ(x)

, (2.7)
g(x) ≡ g(x; p˜, α˜, γs) := 1{x>0}
 p˜
r
+ γs

−
 p˜
r
+ α˜

ζ(x)

, (2.8)
f (x) ≡ f (x; p˜, α˜, γb, γs) := 1{x>0}
 p˜
r
− γb + γs

−
 p˜
r
+ α˜

ζ(x)

. (2.9)
Comparing (2.3) and (2.7), we see that h(x) = 1{x>0}(C(x;− p˜,−α˜)−γb), which means that
the buyer receives the CDS value C(x;− p˜,−α˜) at the cost of γb if she exercises before the seller.
For the seller, the payoff of exercising before the buyer is −g(x) = 1{x>0}(C(x; p˜, α˜) − γs).
Hence, in both cases the fees γb and γs can be viewed as strike prices.
Since C(x; p, α) does not depend on (σ, τ ), Proposition 2.1 implies that finding the saddle
point (σ ∗, τ ∗) for the Nash equilibrium in (2.2) is equivalent to showing that
v(x; σ ∗, τ ) ≤ v(x; σ ∗, τ ∗) ≤ v(x; σ, τ ∗), ∀ σ, τ ∈ S. (2.10)
If the Nash equilibrium exists, then the value of the game is V (x; σ ∗, τ ∗) = C(x)+v(x; σ ∗, τ ∗),
x ∈ R. According to (2.5), the problem is a step-up (resp. step-down) game when α˜ < 0 and
p˜ < 0 (resp. α˜ > 0 and p˜ > 0).
Remark 2.2. If γb = γs = 0, then it follows from (2.7)–(2.9) that h(x) = g(x) = f (x) and
v(x; σ, τ ; p˜, α˜, 0, 0) = Ex

e−r(τ∧σ)1{Xτ∧σ>0, τ∧σ<∞}C(Xτ∧σ ;− p˜,−α˜)

.
In this case, the choice of τ ∗ = σ ∗ = 0 yields the equilibrium (2.10) with equalities, so the
default swap game is always trivially exercised at inception by either party. For similar reasons,
we also rule out the trivial case with p˜ = 0 or α˜ = 0 (even with γs + γb > 0). Furthermore, we
ignore the contract specifications with p˜α˜ < 0 since they mean paying more (resp. less) premium
in exchange for a reduced (resp. increased) protection after exercise. Henceforth, we proceed our
analysis with p˜α˜ > 0 and γb + γs > 0.
Next, we observe the symmetry between the step-up and step-down games.
Proposition 2.2 (Symmetry). For any σ, τ ∈ S, we have v(x; σ, τ ; p˜, α˜, γb, γs) = −v(x; τ, σ ;
− p˜,−α˜, γs, γb).
Applying Proposition 2.2 to the Nash equilibrium condition (2.10), we deduce that if (σ ∗, τ ∗)
is the saddle point for the step-down default swap game with ( p˜, α˜, γb, γs), then the reversed
pair (τ ∗, σ ∗) is the saddle point for the step-up default swap game with (− p˜,−α˜, γs, γb).
Consequently, the symmetry result implies that it is sufficient to study either the step-down or
the step-up default swap game. This significantly simplifies our analysis. Henceforth, we solve
only for the step-down game.
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Also, we notice from (2.1) that if α˜ ≤ γs , then the seller’s benefit of a reduced exposure does
not exceed the fee, and therefore, should never exercise. As a result, the valuation problem is
reduced to a step-down CDS studied in [27], and so we exclude it from our analysis here. With
this observation and Remark 2.2, we will proceed with the following assumption without loss of
generality:
Assumption 2.1. We assume that α˜ > γs ≥ 0, p˜ > 0 and γb + γs > 0.
2.2. Candidate threshold strategies
In the step-down game, the protection buyer has an incentive to step-down when default is
less likely, or equivalently when X is sufficiently high. On the other hand, the protection seller
tends to exercise the step-down option when default is likely to occur, or equivalently when
X is sufficiently small. This intuition leads us to conjecture the following threshold strategies,
respectively, for the buyer and the seller:
τB := inf {t ≥ 0 : X t ∉ (0, B)} , and σA := inf {t ≥ 0 : X t ∉ (A,∞)} ,
for B > A > 0. Clearly, σA, τB ∈ S. For B > A > 0, we denote the candidate value function
vA,B(x) := v(x; σA, τB)
= Ex

e−r(τB∧σA)

h(XτB )1{τB<σA} + g(XσA )1{τB>σA}
+ f (XτB )1{τB=σA}

1{τB∧σA<∞}

= Ex

e−r(τB∧σA)

h(XτB )1{τB<σA} + g(XσA )1{τB>σA}

1{τB∧σA<∞}

(2.11)
for every x ∈ R. The last equality follows since τB = σA implies that τB = σA = σ0, and
f (Xσ0) = 0 a.s.
In subsequent sections, we will identify the candidate exercise thresholds A∗ and B∗ simulta-
neously by applying the principle of continuous and smooth fit:
(continuous fit) vA,B(B−)− h(B) = 0 and vA,B(A+)− g(A) = 0, (2.12)
(smooth fit) v′A,B(B−)− h′(B) = 0 and v′A,B(A+)− g′(A) = 0, (2.13)
if these limits exist.
3. Solution methods for the spectrally negative Le´vy model
We now define X to be a spectrally negative Le´vy process with the Laplace exponent
φ(s) := logE0

es X1

= cs + 1
2
ν2s2 +

(0,∞)
(e−su − 1+ su1{0<u<1})Π (du),
s ∈ R, (3.1)
where c ∈ R, ν ≥ 0 is called the Gaussian coefficient, and Π is a Le´vy measure on (0,∞) such
that

(0,∞)(1 ∧ u2)Π (du) <∞. See [23, p.212]. It admits a unique decomposition:
X = X c + Xd (3.2)
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where X c is the continuous martingale (Brownian motion) part and Xd is the jump and drift part
of X . Moreover,
Xd has paths of bounded variation ⇐⇒
 1
0
uΠ (du) <∞. (3.3)
If this condition (3.3) is satisfied, then the Laplace exponent simplifies to
φ(s) = µs + 1
2
ν2s2 +

(0,∞)
(e−su − 1)Π (du), s ∈ C, (3.4)
where µ := c+ 
(0,1) uΠ (du). Recall that X has paths of bounded variation if and only if ν = 0
and (3.3) holds. We ignore the case when X is a negative subordinator (decreasing a.s.). This
means that we require µ to be strictly positive if ν = 0 and (3.3) holds. We also assume the
following and also Assumption 3.2 below.
Assumption 3.1. We assume that the Le´vy measure Π does not have atoms.
3.1. Main results
We now state our main results concerning the Nash equilibrium and its associated saddle point.
We will identify the pair of thresholds (A∗, B∗) for the seller and buyer at equilibrium. The first
theorem considers the case A∗ > 0, where the seller exercises at a level strictly above zero.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose A∗ > 0. The Nash equilibrium exists with saddle point (σA∗ , τB∗)
satisfying
v(x; σA∗ , τ ) ≤ vA∗,B∗(x) ≤ v(x; σ, τB∗), ∀σ, τ ∈ S. (3.5)
Here vA∗,B∗(x) ≡ v(x; σA∗ , τB∗) as in (2.11) and can be expressed in terms of the scale function
as we shall see in Section 3.2. In particular, the case B∗ = ∞ reflects that τB∗ = σ0 and
vA∗,∞(x) := limB↑∞ vA∗,B(x) is the expected value when the buyer never exercises and the
seller’s strategy is τA∗ . The value function can be computed using (3.16) and (3.23) below.
The case A∗ = 0 may occur, which is more technical and may not yield the Nash equilibrium.
To see why, we notice that a default happens as soon as X touches zero. Therefore, in the event
that X continuously passes (creeps) through zero, the seller would optimally seek to exercise at
a level as close to zero as possible. Nevertheless, this timing strategy is not admissible, though it
can be approximated arbitrarily closely by admissible stopping times.
As shown in Corollary 3.1 below, the case A∗ = 0 is possible only if the jump part Xd
of X is of bounded variation (see (3.3)). This is consistent with our intuition because if X
jumps downward frequently, then the seller has the incentive to step down the position at a level
strictly above zero. On the other hand, when ν = 0 (with no Gaussian component), the process
X never goes through continuously the level zero, so even with A∗ = 0 the Nash equilibrium
in Theorem 3.1 still holds. In contrast, if ν > 0, then an alternative form of “equilibrium” is
attained, namely,
v(x; σ0+, τ ) ≤ v0+,B∗(x) ≤ v(x; σ, τB∗), ∀σ, τ ∈ S, (3.6)
where
v(x; σ0+, τ ) := Ex

e−rτ (h(Xτ )− (α˜ − γs)1{Xτ=0})1{τ<∞}

, τ ∈ S,
v0+,B∗(x) := Ex

e−rτB∗ (h(XτB∗ )− (α˜ − γs)1{XτB∗=0})1{τB∗<∞}

.
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Here, the functions v(x; σ0+, τ ) and v0+,B∗(x) correspond to the limiting case where the seller
exercises arbitrarily close to the default time σ0. However, since the seller cannot predict the
default time, this timing strategy is not admissible and (3.6) is not the Nash equilibrium. In
practice, given the buyer’s strategy τB∗ , the seller’s value function can be approximated with an
ε-optimal strategy by choosing σδ for a sufficiently low exercise level δ > 0.
Let us summarize our equilibrium results for the case A∗ = 0.
Theorem 3.2. For the case A∗ = 0,
(1) if ν = 0, a Nash equilibrium exists with saddle point (σ0, τB∗) and (3.5) holds;
(2) if ν > 0, then the alternative equilibrium (3.6) holds.
In the remainder of this section, we take the following steps to prove the existence of (A∗, B∗)
and Theorems 3.1–3.2:
(1) In Section 3.2, we express the candidate value function vA,B in terms of the Le´vy scale
function.
(2) In Section 3.3, we establish the sufficient conditions for continuous and smooth fit.
(3) In Section 3.4, we show the existence of the candidate optimal thresholds A∗ and B∗
(Theorem 3.3).
(4) In Section 3.5, we verify the optimality of the candidate optimal exercise strategies.
Furthermore, in Section 3.4 we provide an efficient algorithm to compute the pair (A∗, B∗)
and vA∗,B∗(x). Finally, with Theorems 3.1–3.2, the value of the step-down game is recovered
by V (x) = C(x) + v(x) by Proposition 2.1 and that of the step-up game is recovered by
V (x) = C(x)− v(x) by Proposition 2.2.
Remark 3.1. For the fair valuation of the default swap game, one may specify P as the risk-
neutral pricing measure. The risk-neutrality condition would require that φ(1) = r so that the
discounted asset value is a (P,F)-martingale. This condition is not needed for our solution ap-
proach and equilibrium results.
3.2. Expressing vA,B using the scale function
In this subsection, we shall summarize the scale function associated with the process X , and
then apply this to compute the candidate value function vA,B(x) defined in (2.11). For any
spectrally negative Le´vy process, there exists a function W (r) : R → R, which is zero on
(−∞, 0) and continuous and strictly increasing on [0,∞). It is characterized by the Laplace
transform: ∞
0
e−sx W (r)(x)dx = 1
φ(s)− r , s > Φ(r),
where Φ is the right inverse of φ, defined by
Φ(r) := sup{λ ≥ 0 : φ(λ) = r}.
The function W (r) is often called the (r-)scale function in the literature (see e.g. [23]).
With Φ(r) and W (r), we can define the function WΦ(r) = {WΦ(r)(x); x ∈ R} by
WΦ(r)(x) = e−Φ(r)x W (r)(x), x ∈ R. (3.7)
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As is well known (see [23, Chapter 8]), the function WΦ(r)(x) is increasing, and satisfies
WΦ(r)(x) ↑ 1
φ′(Φ(r))
as x ↑ ∞. (3.8)
From Lemmas 4.3–4.4 of [26], we also summarize the behavior of W (r) in the neighborhood of
zero:
W (r)(0) =
0, unbounded variation1
µ
, bounded variation
 and
W (r)
′
(0+) =

2
ν2
, ν > 0
∞, ν = 0 and Π (0,∞) = ∞
r +Π (0,∞)
µ2
, compound Poisson
 .
(3.9)
To facilitate calculations, we define the function
Z (r)(x) := 1+ r
 x
0
W (r)(y)dy, x ∈ R
which satisfies that
Z (r)(x)
W (r)(x)
x↑∞−−−→ r
Φ(r)
; (3.10)
see [23] Exercise 8.5. By Theorem 8.5 of [23], the Laplace transform of σ0 in (2.4) can be
expressed as
ζ(x) = Z (r)(x)− r
Φ(r)
W (r)(x), x > 0. (3.11)
Regarding the smoothness of the scale function, Assumption 3.1 guarantees that W (r)(x) is
differentiable on (0,∞) (see, e.g., [12]). By (3.11), Laplace transform function ζ is also
differentiable on (0,∞), and so are the functions h, g, f in (2.7)–(2.9). In this paper, we need
the twice differentiability for the case of unbounded variation.
Assumption 3.2. For the case X is of unbounded variation, we assume that W (r) is twice
differentiable on (0,∞).
This assumption is automatically satisfied if ν > 0 as in [12], and the same property holds for
ζ, h, g, and f . While this is not guaranteed for the unbounded variation case with ν = 0, it is
an assumption commonly needed when the verification of optimality requires the infinitesimal
generator.
Moreover, as in (8.18) of [23],
W (r)
′
(y)
W (r)(y)
≤ W
(r)′(x)
W (r)(x)
and
W ′Φ(r)(y)
WΦ(r)(y)
≤ W
′
Φ(r)(x)
WΦ(r)(x)
, y > x > 0, (3.12)
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and, using (3.8), we deduce that
W (r)
′
(x)
W (r)(x)
= Φ(r)e
Φ(r)x WΦ(r)(x)+ eΦ(r)x W ′Φ(r)(x)
eΦ(r)x WΦ(r)(x)
= Φ(r)WΦ(r)(x)+ W
′
Φ(r)(x)
WΦ(r)(x)
x↑∞−−−→ Φ(r). (3.13)
In applying the scale function to compute vA,B(x), we first consider the case 0 < A < B <∞
and then extend to the cases A ↓ 0 and B ↑ ∞, namely,
vA,∞(x) := lim
B↑∞ vA,B(x) and v0+,B(x) := limA↓0 vA,B(x). (3.14)
For 0 < A < x < B <∞, define
Υ(x; A, B) :=
 p˜
r
− γb

Ex

e−r(σA∧τB )1{τB<σA}

+
 p˜
r
+ γs

Ex

e−r(σA∧τB )1{τB>σA or σA∧τB=σ0}

+ (α˜ − γs)Ex

e−r(σA∧τB )1{σA∧τB=σ0}

. (3.15)
We observe that vA,B(x) − h(x) and vA,B(x) − g(x) are similar and they possess the common
term Υ(x; A, B).
Lemma 3.1. For 0 < A < x < B <∞,
vA,B(x)− h(x) = Υ(x; A, B)−
 p˜
r
− γb

,
vA,B(x)− g(x) = Υ(x; A, B)−
 p˜
r
+ γs

,
(3.16)
and
Υ(x; A, B) = W (r)(x − A) Ψ(A, B)
W (r)(B − A) +
 p˜
r
+ γs

Z (r)(x − A)
− (α˜ − γs)κ(x; A), (3.17)
where
Ψ(A, B) :=
 p˜
r
− γb

−
 p˜
r
+ γs

Z (r)(B − A)+ (α˜ − γs) κ(B; A),
0 < A < B <∞, (3.18)
κ(x; A) :=
 ∞
A
Π (du)
 u∧x−A
0
dzW (r)(x − z − A)
= 1
r
 ∞
A
Π (du)

Z (r)(x − A)− Z (r)(x − u)

, x > A > 0. (3.19)
The function Ψ(A, B) as in (3.18) will play a crucial role in the continuous and smooth fit as
we discuss in Section 3.3 below and also in the proof of the existence of a pair (A∗, B∗) as in
Section 3.4.
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Now we extend our definition of vA,B for A = 0+ and B = ∞ as in (3.14), and then derive
the strategies that attain them. As we shall see in Corollary 3.1 below, our candidate threshold
level for the seller A∗ is always strictly positive if Xd is of unbounded variation whether or not
there is a Gaussian component. For this reason, we consider the limit as A ↓ 0 only when (3.3)
is satisfied.
In view of (3.16), the limits in (3.14) can be obtained by extending Υ(x; A, B) with A ↓ 0
and B ↑ ∞; namely we take limits in (3.17). Here Ψ as in (3.18) explodes as B ↑ ∞ and hence
we define an extended version of Ψ(A, B)/W (r)(B − A) by, for any 0 ≤ A < B ≤ ∞ (with the
assumption
 1
0 uΠ (du) <∞ for A = 0),
Ψ(A, B) :=

1
W (r)(B − A)

p˜
r
− γb

−

p˜
r
+ γs

Z (r)(B − A)
+ (α˜ − γs) κ(B; A)

, B <∞,
1
Φ(r)
(−( p˜ + rγs)+ (α˜ − γs)ρ(A)) , B = ∞,
(3.20)
where
ρ(A) :=
 ∞
A
Π (du)

1− e−Φ(r)(u−A)

=
 ∞
0
Π (du + A)

1− e−Φ(r)u

, A ≥ 0
and
κ(x; 0) :=
 ∞
0
Π (du)
 u∧x
0
dzW (r)(x − z)
= 1
r
 ∞
0
Π (du)

Z (r)(x)− Z (r)(x − u)

, x > 0. (3.21)
Here, ρ(0) = ∞0 Π (du) 1− e−Φ(r)u is finite if and only if (3.3) holds. Clearly, Ψ(A, B) =
Ψ (A,B)
W (r)(B−A) when 0 < A < B <∞. We shall confirm the convergence results and other auxiliary
results below.
Lemma 3.2. For any fixed x > 0,
(1) κ(x; A) is monotonically decreasing in A on (0, x),
(2) if
 1
0 uΠ (du) <∞, then κ(x; 0) = limA↓0 κ(x; A) <∞,
(3) for every A > 0 (extended to A ≥ 0 if  10 uΠ (du) <∞), κ(x;A)W (r)(x−A) x↑∞−−−→ ρ(A)Φ(r) .
Lemma 3.3. (1) We have limB↑∞ Ψ(A, B) = Ψ(A,∞) for every A > 0 (extended to A ≥ 0 if 1
0 uΠ (du) <∞).
(2) When
 1
0 uΠ (du) <∞, for every 0 < B <∞ and 0 < B ≤ ∞, respectively,
lim
A↓0Ψ(A, B) =
 p˜
r
− γb

−
 p˜
r
+ γs

Z (r)(B)+ (α˜ − γs) κ(B; 0)
=: Ψ(0, B), (3.22)
and Ψ(0, B) = limA↓0 Ψ(A, B).
(3) For every A > 0 (extended to A ≥ 0 if  10 uΠ (du) <∞), Ψ(A, A+) < 0.
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Using the above, for 0 < A < x , we obtain the limit
Υ(x; A,∞) := lim
B↑∞Υ(x; A, B) = W
(r)(x − A)Ψ(A,∞)
+
 p˜
r
+ γs

Z (r)(x − A)− (α˜ − γs) κ(x; A), (3.23)
and, for 0 < x < B ≤ ∞,
Υ(x; 0+, B) := lim
A↓0Υ(x; A, B)
= W (r)(x)Ψ(0, B)+  p˜
r
+ γs

Z (r)(x)− (α˜ − γs) κ(x; 0). (3.24)
In summary, we have expressed vA,B including its limits in (3.14) in terms of the scale function.
Remark 3.2. We note that vA,B(x) is C1(A, B) and in particular C2(A, B) when X is of
unbounded variation. Indeed, κ(x; A) is C1(A, B) and in particular C2(A, B) when X is of
unbounded variation. See also the discussion immediately before and after Assumption 3.2 for
the same smoothness property on (0,∞) \ [A, B].
We now construct the strategies that achieve vA,∞(x) and v0+,B(x). As the following remark
shows, the interpretation of the former is fairly intuitive and it is attained when the buyer never
exercises and his strategy is σ0.
Remark 3.3. By (3.11) and Lemma 3.4 of [27], respectively, we have, for any A > 0,
Ex

e−rσA
 = Z (r)(x− A)− rΦ(r)W (r)(x− A) and Ex e−rσA 1{σA=σ0<∞} = W (r)(x− A)ρ(A)Φ(r)−
κ(x; A) and hence it can be confirmed from (3.23) that
Υ(x; A,∞) =
 p˜
r
+ γs

Ex

e−rσA
+ (α˜ − γs)Ex e−rσA 1{σA=σ0<∞} ,
which corresponds to the value when the buyer’s strategy is σ0 and the seller’s strategy is σA.
On the other hand, v0+,B(x) is slightly more difficult to understand. Suppose we substitute
A = 0 directly into (3.15) (or the seller never exercises and her strategy is σ0), we obtain
Υ(x; 0, B) :=
 p˜
r
− γb

Ex

e−rτB 1{τB<σ0, τB<∞}
+  p˜
r
+ α˜

Ex

e−rτB 1{τB=σ0<∞}

,
0 < B ≤ ∞.
As shown in Remark 3.4 below, Υ(x; 0, B) matches Υ(x; 0+, B) if and only if there is not a
Gaussian component. Upon the existence of Gaussian component, there is a positive probability
of continuously down-crossing (creeping) zero, and the seller tends to exercise immediately
before it reaches zero rather than not exercising at all.
Remark 3.4. The right-hand limit Υ(x; 0+, B) := limA↓0Υ(x; A, B) is given by
Υ(x; 0+, B) = Υ(x; 0, B)− (α˜ − γs)Ex

e−rτB 1{XτB=0, τB<∞}

,
0 < x < B ≤ ∞. (3.25)
Therefore, Υ(x; A, B) A↓0−−→ Υ(x; 0, B) if and only if the Gaussian coefficient ν = 0.
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Upon the existence of a Gaussian component, Υ(x; 0, B) > Υ(x; 0+, B), but there does
not exist a seller’s strategy that attains v0+,B . However, for any ε > 0, the ε-optimal strategy
(when the buyer’s strategy is τB) can be attained by choosing a sufficiently small level. Without
a Gaussian component, Υ(x; 0, B) = Υ(x; 0+, B) and the seller may choose σ0.
3.3. Continuous and smooth fit
We shall now find the candidate thresholds A∗ and B∗ by continuous and smooth fit. As we
will show below, the continuous and smooth fit conditions (2.12)–(2.13) will yield the equivalent
conditions Ψ(A∗, B∗) = ψ(A∗, B∗) = 0 where
ψ(A, B) := ∂
∂B
Ψ(A, B) = −W (r)(B − A) ( p˜ + γsr)
+ (α˜ − γs)
 ∞
A
Π (du)

W (r)(B − A)− W (r)(B − u)

,
for all 0 < A < B <∞. Here the second equality holds because for every x > A > 0
Z (r)
′
(x − A) = r W (r)(x − A) and
κ ′(x; A) =
 ∞
A
Π (du)

W (r)(x − A)− W (r)(x − u)

,
(3.26)
where the latter holds because Z (r)
′
(x) = r W (r)(x) on R \ {0} and Z (r) is continuous on R.
As in the case of Ψ(A, ·), it can be seen that ψ(A, ·) also tends to explode as B ↑ ∞ with A
fixed. For this reason, we also define the extended version of ψ(A, B)/W (r)(B − A) by, for any
0 ≤ A < B ≤ ∞ (with the assumption  10 uΠ (du) <∞ for A = 0),
ψ(A, B) :=
−( p˜ + γsr)+ (α˜ − γs)
 ∞
A
Π (du)

1− W
(r)(B − u)
W (r)(B − A)

, B <∞,
−( p˜ + rγs)+ (α˜ − γs)ρ(A), B = ∞.
(3.27)
The convergence results as A ↓ 0 and B ↑ ∞ as well as some monotonicity properties are
discussed below.
Lemma 3.4. (1) For fixed 0 < B ≤ ∞, ψ(A, B) is decreasing in A on (0, B), and in particular
when
 1
0 uΠ (du) <∞, ψ(0, B) = limA↓0 ψ(A, B).
(2) For fixed A > 0 (extended to A ≥ 0 if  10 uΠ (du) < ∞), ψ(A, B) is decreasing in B on
(A,∞) and ψ(A, B) ↓ ψ(A,∞) as B ↑ ∞.
(3) The relationship ψ(0, B) = ∂Ψ(0, B)/∂B also holds for any 0 < B <∞ given  10 uΠ (du)
<∞ where Ψ(0, B) is defined as in (3.22) and
ψ(0, B) := W (r)(B)

−( p˜ + γsr)+ (α˜ − γs)
 ∞
0
Π (du)

1− W
(r)(B − u)
W (r)(B)

.
Fig. 1 gives numerical plots of Ψ(A, ·), Ψ(A, ·), ψ(A, ·) and ψ(A, ·) for various values of
A > 0. Lemma 3.4(1, 2) and the fact that ψ(A, B) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ ψ(A, B) ≥ 0 imply that, given a
fixed A, there are three possible behaviors for Ψ :
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Fig. 1. Illustration of Ψ(A, B), Ψ(A, B), ψ(A, B), and ψ(A, B) as functions of B.
(a) For small A, Ψ(A, B) is monotonically increasing in B.
(b) For large A, Ψ(A, B) is monotonically decreasing in B.
(c) Otherwise Ψ(A, B) first increases and then decreases in B.
The behavior of Ψ has implications for the existence and uniqueness of A∗ and B∗, as shown
in Theorem 3.3 and Lemma 3.5 below. Besides, it can be confirmed that Ψ(A, ·) and ψ(A, ·)
converge as B ↑ ∞ as in Lemmas 3.3(1) and 3.4(2). We shall see that the continuous/smooth
fit conditions (2.12)–(2.13) require (except for the case A∗ = 0 or B∗ = ∞) that Ψ(A∗, B∗) =ψ(A∗, B∗) = 0, or equivalently Ψ(A∗, B∗) = ψ(A∗, B∗) = 0. This is illustrated by the line
corresponding to A = 1.6292 in Fig. 1.
We begin with establishing the continuous fit condition.
Continuous fit at B: continuous fit at B is satisfied automatically for all cases since
vA,B(B−)− h(B) exists and
vA,B(B−)− h(B) = Υ(B−; A, B)−

p˜
r
− γb

= 0, 0 < A < B <∞, (3.28)
which also holds when A = 0+ and v0+,B(B−) − h(B) = 0 given
 1
0 uΠ (du) < ∞. This is
also clear from the fact that a spectrally negative Le´vy process always creeps upward and hence
B is regular for (B,∞) for any arbitrary level B > 0 (see [23, p. 212]).
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Continuous fit at A: we examine the limit of vA,B(x)− g(x) as x ↓ A, namely,
vA,B(A+)− g(A) = W (r)(0)Ψ(A, B), 0 < A < B ≤ ∞. (3.29)
In view of (3.9), continuous fit at A holds automatically for the unbounded variation case. For
the bounded variation case, the continuous fit condition is equivalent to
Ψ(A, B) = 0. (3.30)
We now pursue the smooth fit condition. Substituting (3.26) into the derivative of (3.17), we
obtain
v′A,B(x)− h′(x) = v′A,B(x)− g′(x) = Υ ′(x; A, B)
= W (r)′(x − A)Ψ(A, B)− ψ(A, x), (3.31)
for every 0 < A < x < B ≤ ∞ (extended to A = 0+ when  10 uΠ (du) <∞).
Smooth fit at B: with (3.31), the smooth fit condition v′A,B(B−) − h′(B) = 0 at B < ∞
amounts to
∂
∂B
Ψ(A, B) = 0
because
W (r)
′
(B − A)Ψ(A, B)− ψ(A, B)
= −W (r)(B − A)
ψ(A, B)− W (r)′(B − A)
W (r)(B − A)
Ψ(A, B)
and
∂
∂B
Ψ(A, B) = ψ(A, B)− W (r)′(B − A)
W (r)(B − A)
Ψ(A, B). (3.32)
For the case with A = 0+ and  10 uΠ (du) < ∞, the smooth fit condition v′0+,B(B−) −
h′(B) = 0 requires ∂
∂B
Ψ(0, B) = 0, which is well-defined by Lemmas 3.3(2) and 3.4(1) and
(3.32).
Smooth fit at A: assuming that it has paths of unbounded variation (W (r)(0) = 0), then we
obtain
v′A,B(A+)− g′(A) = W (r)
′
(0+)Ψ(A, B), 0 < A < B ≤ ∞.
Therefore, (3.30) is also a sufficient condition for smooth fit at A for the unbounded variation
case.
We conclude that
(1) if Ψ(A, B) = 0, then continuous fit at A holds for the bounded variation case and both
continuous and smooth fit at A holds for the unbounded variation case;
(2) if ∂
∂B
Ψ(A, B) = 0, then both continuous and smooth fit conditions at B hold for all cases.
If both Ψ(A, B) = 0 and ∂
∂B
Ψ(A, B) = 0 are satisfied, then ψ(A, B) = 0 automatically follows
by (3.32).
362 M. Egami et al. / Stochastic Processes and their Applications 123 (2013) 347–384
3.4. Existence and identification of (A∗, B∗)
In the previous subsection, we have derived the defining equations for the candidate pair
(A∗, B∗). Nevertheless, the computation of (A∗, B∗) is non-trivial and depends on the behaviors
of functions Ψ(A, B) and ψ(A, B). In this subsection, we prove the existence of (A∗, B∗) and
provide a procedure to calculate their values.
Recall from Lemma 3.4(1) that ψ(A,∞) is decreasing in A and observe that ψ(A, A+) :=
limx↓A ψ(A, x) = −( p˜ + rγs)+ (α˜ − γs)Π (A,∞) is also decreasing in A. Hence, let A and A
be the unique values such thatψ(A,∞) ≡ −( p˜ + rγs)+ (α˜ − γs)ρ(A) = 0, (3.33)ψ(A, A+) ≡ −( p˜ + rγs)+ (α˜ − γs)Π (A,∞) = 0, (3.34)
upon existence; we set the former zero if ψ(A,∞) < 0 for all A ≥ 0 and also set the latter zero
if ψ(A, A+) < 0 for any A ≥ 0. Since ρ(A) ↓ 0 and Π (A,∞) ↓ 0 as A ↑ ∞, A and A are
finite. In addition, ρ(A) < Π (A,∞) implies that A ≥ A.
Define for every A ≤ A ≤ A,
b(A) := inf{B > A : Ψ(A, B) ≥ 0} ≡ inf {B > A : Ψ(A, B) ≥ 0} ,
b(A) := inf{B > A : ψ(A, B) ≤ 0} ≡ inf {B > A : ψ(A, B) ≤ 0} ,
b(A) := inf

B > A : Ψ(A, B)− ψ(A, B) W (r)(B − A)
W (r)′(B − A) ≥ 0

,
(3.35)
where we assume inf∅ = ∞. For b(A) above, we recall from (3.32) that
Ψ(A, B)− ψ(A, B) W (r)(B − A)
W (r)′(B − A) = 0 ⇐⇒
∂
∂B
Ψ(A, B) = 0. (3.36)
Also, using Lemmas 3.3(1) and 3.4(2) and that Φ(r)Ψ(A,∞) = ψ(A,∞) (see (3.13), (3.20)
and (3.27)), we obtain the limit
lim
B↑∞
Ψ(A, B)− ψ(A, B) W (r)(B − A)
W (r)′(B − A)

= 0. (3.37)
Next, we show that there always exists a pair (A∗, B∗) belonging to one of the following four
cases:
case 1: 0 < A∗ < B∗ <∞ with B∗ = b(A∗) = b(A∗) <∞;
case 2: 0 < A∗ < B∗ = ∞ with B∗ = b(A∗) = b(A∗) = ∞ and Ψ(A∗,∞) = 0;
case 3: 0 = A∗ < B∗ <∞ with B∗ = b(0) ≤ b(0);
case 4: 0 = A∗ < B∗ = ∞ with b(0) = ∞ and b(0) = ∞.
Theorem 3.3. (1) If A > 0 and b(A) < ∞, then there exists A∗ ∈ (A, A) such that
B∗ = b(A∗) = b(A∗) <∞. This corresponds to case 1.
(2) If A > 0 and b(A) = ∞, then A∗ = A and B∗ = ∞ satisfy the condition for case 2.
(3) If A = 0, A > 0, and b(0) < b(0), then there exists A∗ ∈ (0, A) such that B∗ = b(A∗) =
b(A∗). This corresponds to case 1.
(4) Suppose (i) A = 0 or (ii) A = 0 and b(0) ≥ b(0). If b(0) <∞, then A∗ = 0 and B∗ = b(0)
satisfy the condition for case 3. If b(0) = ∞, then A∗ = 0 and B∗ = ∞ satisfy the condition
for case 4.
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In particular, from (3.3) and (3.33) we infer that
 1
0 uΠ (du) = ∞ implies A > 0. This
together with Theorem 3.3 leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1. If Xd as in (3.2) has paths of unbounded variation, then
 1
0 uΠ (du) = ∞ and
A∗ > 0.
Remark 3.5. Note that b(A) = b(A) implies b(A) = b(A) = b(A) (even when they are +∞;
see (3.37)). By the construction in (3.35), A∗ and B∗ obtained above must satisfy:
(1) For every A∗ < B < B∗, Ψ(A∗, B) < 0 and Ψ(A∗, B)− ψ(A∗, B) W (r)(B−A∗)
W (r)′ (B−A∗) < 0.
(2) If A∗ > 0, then Ψ(A∗, B∗) = 0 (continuous or smooth fit at A∗ is satisfied).
(3) Ψ(A∗, B∗)− ψ(A∗, B∗) W (r)(B∗−A∗)
W (r)′ (B∗−A∗) = 0 (continuous and smooth fit at B∗ is satisfied); see
(3.36).
In Theorem 3.3(1,3), we need to further identify (A∗, B∗). To this end, we first observe
Lemma 3.5. (1) b(A) increases in A on (A, A), and (2) b(A) decreases in A on (A, A).
This lemma implies that (i) if b(A) > b(A), then A∗ must lie on (A, A) and (ii) if
b(A) < b(A), then A∗ must lie on (A, A). By Lemma 3.5 and Theorem 3.3, the following
algorithm, motivated by the bisection method, is guaranteed to output the pair (A∗, B∗). Here let
ε > 0 be the error parameter.
Step 1: Compute A and A.
Step 1-1: If (i) A = 0 or (ii) A = 0 and b(0) ≥ b(0), then stop and conclude that this
is case 3 or 4 with A∗ = 0 and B∗ = b(0).
Step 1-2: If A > 0 and b(A) = ∞, then stop and conclude that this is case 2 with
A∗ = A and B∗ = ∞.
Step 2: Set A = (A + A)/2.
Step 3: Compute b(A) and b(A).
Step 3-1: If |b(A)− b(A)| ≤ ε, then stop and conclude that this is case 1 with A∗ = A
and B∗ = b(A) (or B∗ = b(A)).
Step 3-2: If |b(A) − b(A)| > ε and b(A) > b(A), then set A = A and go back to
Step 2.
Step 3-3: If |b(A) − b(A)| > ε and b(A) < b(A), then set A = A and go back to
Step 2.
3.5. Verification of equilibrium
We are now ready to prove Theorems 3.1–3.2. Our candidate value function for the Nash
equilibrium is given by (2.11) and (3.14) with A∗ and B∗ obtained by the procedure above. By
Lemma 3.1,
vA∗,B∗(x) =
h(x), x ≥ B
∗
h(x)+ (vA∗,B∗(x)− h(x)), A∗ < x < B∗
g(x), x ≤ A∗

= −
 p˜
r
+ α˜

ζ(x)+ J (x) (3.38)
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where
J (x) :=

p˜
r
− γb, x ≥ B∗,
Υ(x; A∗, B∗), A∗ < x < B∗,
p˜
r
+ γs, 0 < x ≤ A∗,
p˜
r
+ α˜ x ≤ 0.
(3.39)
When A∗ > 0, (σA∗ , τB∗) is the candidate saddle point that attains vA∗,B∗(x). When A∗ = 0,
v0+,B∗(x) can be approximated by (σε, τB∗) for sufficiently small ε > 0. The value of
Υ(x; A∗, B∗) can be computed by (3.17), (3.23) and (3.24).
The proof of Theorems 3.1–3.2 involves the crucial steps:
(i) Domination property
(a) Ex

e−r(τ∧σA∗ )vA∗,B∗(Xτ∧σA∗ )1{τ∧σA∗<∞}
 ≥ v(x; σA∗ , τ ) for all τ ∈ S;
(b) Ex

e−r(σ∧τB∗ )vA∗,B∗(Xσ∧τB∗ )1{σ∧τB∗<∞}
 ≤ v(x; σ, τB∗) for all σ ∈ S;
(ii) Sub/super-harmonic property
(a) (L− r)vA∗,B∗(x) > 0 for every 0 < x < A∗;
(b) (L− r)vA∗,B∗(x) = 0 for every A∗ < x < B∗;
(c) (L− r)vA∗,B∗(x) < 0 for every x > B∗.
Here L is the infinitesimal generator associated with the process X
L f (x) = c f ′(x)+ 1
2
ν2 f ′′(x)+
 ∞
0

f (x − z)− f (x)+ f ′(x)z1{0<z<1}

Π (dz)
applied to any bounded and sufficiently smooth function f that is C2 when X is of unbounded
variation and C1 otherwise.
After establishing (i)–(ii) above, we will apply them to establish (2.10) by showing for the
candidate optimal thresholds (A∗, B∗) that
v(x; σA∗ , τ ) ≤ vA∗,B∗(x) ≤ v(x; σ, τB∗), ∀σ, τ ∈ S. (3.40)
Remark 3.6. In fact, it is sufficient to show (3.40) holds for all τ ∈ SA∗ and σ ∈ SB∗ , where
SA∗ :=

τ ∈ S : Xτ ∉ (0, A∗] a.s.

and SB∗ :=

σ ∈ S : Xσ ∉ [B∗,∞) a.s.

. (3.41)
Indeed, for any candidate τ ∈ S, it follows that v(x; σA∗ , τ ) ≤ v(x; σA∗ , τˆ ) where τˆ :=
τ1{Xτ ∉(0,A∗]} + σ01{Xτ∈(0,A∗]} ∈ SA∗ , so the buyer’s optimal exercise time τ ∗ must belong to
SA∗ . This is intuitive since the seller will end the game as soon as X enters (0, A∗] and hence
the buyer should not needlessly stop in this interval and pay γb. Similar arguments apply to the
use of SB∗ . Then, using the same arguments as for (2.11), we can again safely eliminate the f (·)
term in (2.6) and write
v(x; σA∗ , τ ) = Ex

e−r(τ∧σA∗ )

h(Xτ )1{τ<σA∗ } + g(XσA∗ )1{τ>σA∗ }

1{τ∧σA∗<∞}

,
τ ∈ SA∗ ,
v(x; σ, τB∗) = Ex

e−r(τB∗∧σ)

h(XτB∗ )1{τB∗<σ } + g(Xσ )1{τB∗>σ }

1{τB∗∧σ<∞}

,
σ ∈ SB∗ .
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We prove properties (i)–(ii) above using the following lemmas.
Lemma 3.6. For every x ∈ (A∗, B∗), the following inequalities hold:
vA∗,B∗(x)− g(x) ≤ 0, (3.42)
vA∗,B∗(x)− h(x) ≥ 0, (3.43)
where it is understood for the case with A∗ = 0 and ν > 0 that the above results hold with
A∗ = 0+.
Applying this lemma and the definitions of SA∗ and SB∗ in (3.41) of Remark 3.6, we obtain
Lemma 3.7. Fix x > 0.
(1) For every τ ∈ SA∗ , when A∗ > 0
g(XσA∗ )1{σA∗<τ } + h(Xτ )1{τ<σA∗ } ≤ vA∗,B∗(XσA∗∧τ ), Px -a.s. on {σA∗ ∧ τ <∞},
and when A∗ = 0,
−(α˜ − γs)1{Xτ=0} + h(Xτ )1{τ<σ0} ≤ v0+,B∗(Xτ ), Px -a.s. on {τ <∞}.
(2) For every σ ∈ SB∗ ,
g(Xσ )1{σ<τB∗ } + h(XτB∗ )1{τB∗<σ } ≥ vA∗,B∗(Xσ∧τB∗ ), Px -a.s. on {σ ∧ τB∗ <∞},
where it is understood for the case with A∗ = 0 and ν > 0 that the above holds with
A∗ = 0+.
Lemma 3.8. (1) When A∗ > 0, we have (L− r)vA∗,B∗(x) > 0 for every 0 < x < A∗.
(2) We have (L− r)vA∗,B∗(x) = 0 for every A∗ < x < B∗.
(3) When B∗ <∞, we have (L− r)vA∗,B∗(x) < 0 for every x > B∗.
The domination property (i) holds by applying discounting and expectation in Lemma 3.7.
The sub/super-harmonic property (ii) is implied by Lemma 3.8. By Ito’s lemma, this shows that
the stopped processes e−r(t∧σA∗ )vA∗,B∗(X t∧σA∗ ) and e−r(t∧τB∗ )vA∗,B∗(X t∧τB∗ ) are, respectively,
a supermartingale and a submartingale. In turn, we apply them to show vA∗,B∗(x) ≥ v(x; σA∗ , τ )
for any arbitrary τ ∈ SA∗ , and vA∗,B∗(x) ≤ v(x; σ, τB∗) for any arbitrary σ ∈ SB∗ , that is, the
Nash equilibrium. We provide the details of the proofs for Theorems 3.1–3.2 in the Appendix.
4. Exponential jumps and numerical examples
In this section, we consider spectrally negative Le´vy processes with i.i.d. exponential jumps
and provide some numerical examples to illustrate the buyer’s and seller’s optimal exercise
strategies and the impact of step-up/down fees on the game value. The results obtained here
can be extended easily to the hyperexponential case using the explicit expression of the scale
function obtained by [15], and can be used to approximate for a general case with a completely
monotone density (see, e.g., [15,18]). Here, however, we focus on a rather simple case for more
intuitive interpretation of our numerical results.
4.1. Spectrally negative Le´vy processes with exponential jumps
Let X be a spectrally negative Le´vy process of the form
X t − X0 = µt + νBt −
Nt
n=1
Zn, 0 ≤ t <∞.
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Here B = {Bt ; t ≥ 0} is a standard Brownian motion, N = {Nt ; t ≥ 0} is a Poisson process with
arrival rate λ, and Z = {Zn; n = 1, 2, . . .} is an i.i.d. sequence of exponential random variables
with density function f (z) := ηe−ηz , z > 0, for some 0 < η <∞. Its Laplace exponent (3.1) is
given by
φ(s) = µs + 1
2
ν2s2 − λ s
η + s .
For our examples, we assume ν > 0. In this case, there are two negative solutions to the
equation φ(s) = r and their absolute values {ξi,r ; i = 1, 2} satisfy the interlacing condition:
0 < ξ1,r < η < ξ2,r <∞. For this process, the scale function is given by for every x ≥ 0
W (r)(x) =
2
i=1
Ci

eΦ(r)x − e−ξi,r x

, (4.1)
for some C1 and C2 (see [15] for their expressions). In addition, applying (4.1) to (3.7) yields
WΦ(r)(x) =
2
i=1
Ci

1− e−(Φ(r)+ξi,r )x

,
with the limit WΦ(r)(∞) =
2
i=1 Ci , which equals (φ′(Φ(r)))−1 by (3.8).
Recall that, in contrast to ψ(A, B) and Ψ(A, B), ψ(A, B) and Ψ(A, B) do not explode.
Therefore, they are used to compute the optimal thresholds A∗ and B∗ and the value function V .
Below we provide the formulas for ψ(A, B) and Ψ(A, B). The computations are very tedious
but straightforward, so we omit the proofs here.
In summary, for B > A ≥ 0, we have
ψ(A, B) = −( p˜ + γsr)+ (α˜ − γs) λe−ηA − WΦ(r)(∞)WΦ(r)(B − A) (α˜ − γs)λ ηΦ(r)+ η e−ηA
+ α˜ − γs
WΦ(r)(B − A)λe
−Φ(r)(B−A)
×
2
i=1
Ci
 η
Φ(r)+ η e
−ηB + η
ξi,r − η

e−ηB − e−ξi,r (B−A)−ηA

and
Ψ(A, B) = 1
WΦ(r)(B − A)

WΦ(r)(∞)

λe−ηA α˜ − γs
Φ(r)+ η −
p˜ + γsr
Φ(r)

+ e−Φ(r)(B−A)ϱ(A, B)

where
ϱ(A, B) := (α˜ − γs) λ
2
i=1
Ci

e−ηB

− 1
Φ(r)+ η +
1
ξi,r − η

− e−ηA−ξi,r (B−A) 1
ξi,r − η

− ( p˜ + γsr)
2
i=1
Ci

− 1
Φ(r)
+ 1
ξi,r

e−ξi,r (B−A) − 1

− (γb + γs) .
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Fig. 2. The value for the buyer V (x; σA∗ , τB∗ ) as a function of x . Here r = 0.03, p = 500 bps, µ = 0.1352, λ = 1.0,
η = 2.0, ν = 0.2, and γb = γs = 1000 bps.
Also, setting B = ∞ and B = A+, (3.33)–(3.34) yield
ψ(A,∞) = − ( p˜ + γsr)+ λ(α˜ − γs) Φ(r)Φ(r)+ η e−ηA andψ(A, A+) = − ( p˜ + γsr)+ (α˜ − γs) λe−ηA.
4.2. Numerical results
Let us denote the step-up/down ratio by q := pˆ/p = αˆ/α. We consider four contract specifi-
cations:
(C) cancellation game with q = 0 (position canceled at exercise),
(D) step-down game with q = 0.5 (position halved at exercise),
(V) vanilla CDS with q = 1.0 (position unchanged at exercise),
(U) step-up game with q = 1.5 (position raised at exercise).
The model parameters are r = 0.03, λ = 1.0, η = 2.0, ν = 0.2, α = 1, x = 1.5 and γs =
γb = 1000 bps, unless specified otherwise. We also choose µ so that the risk-neutral condition
φ(1) = r is satisfied.
Fig. 2 shows for all four cases the contract value V to the buyer as a function of x given a
fixed premium rate. It is decreasing in x since default is less likely for higher value of x . For the
cancellation game, V takes the constant values γs = 1000 bps for x ≤ A∗ and−γb = −1000 bps
for x ≥ B∗ since in these regions immediate cancellation with a fee is optimal.
In Fig. 3, we show the optimal thresholds A∗ and B∗ and the value V with respect to p. The
symmetry argument discussed in Section 2 applies to the cases (D) and (U). As a result, the A∗ in
(D) is identical to the B∗ in (U), and the B∗ in (D) is identical to the A∗ in (U). In all four cases,
both A∗ and B∗ are decreasing in p. In other words, as p increases, the buyer tends to exercise
earlier while the seller tends to delay exercise. Intuitively, a higher premium makes waiting more
costly for the buyer but more profitable for the seller. The value V in the cancellation game
stays constant when p is sufficiently small because the seller would exercise immediately; it also
becomes flat when p is sufficiently high because the buyer would exercise immediately.
Note that the value function V and the optimal stopping strategies (σ ∗, τ ∗) depend on the
premium rate p. In particular, we call p∗ the equilibrium premium rate if it yields V (x; σ ∗(p∗),
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Fig. 3. (Left) Optimal threshold levels A∗ and B∗ and (right) the value for the buyer with respect to p. The parameters
are r = 0.03, x = 1.5, µ = 0.3433, λ = 0.5, η = 2.0, ν = 0.2, and γb = γs = 1000 bps.
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Fig. 4. The equilibrium premium p∗ with respect to γs (left) and γb (right). Here r = 0.03, x = 1.5, µ = 0.3433,
λ = 1.0, η = 2.0, ν = 0.2, and γb = γs = 1000 bps unless specified otherwise.
τ ∗(p∗)) = 0, where we emphasize the saddle point (σ ∗(p∗), τ ∗(p∗)) corresponds to p∗. Hence,
under the equilibrium premium rate, the default swap game starts at value zero, implying no
cash transaction between the protection buyer and seller at contract initiation. As illustrated in
Fig. 3(b), the value V (from the buyer’s perspective) is always decreasing in p. Using a bisection
method, we numerically determine the equilibrium premium p∗ so that V = 0. We illustrate in
Fig. 4 the equilibrium premium p∗ as a function of γb and γs . As is intuitive, the equilibrium
premium p∗ is increasing in γs and decreasing in γb.
5. Conclusions
We have discussed the valuation of a default swap contract where the protection buyer and
seller can alter the respective position once prior to default. This new contractual feature drives
the protection buyer/seller to consider the optimal timing to control credit risk exposure. The
valuation problem involves the analytical and numerical studies of an optimal stopping game
with early termination from default. Under a perpetual setting, the investors’ optimal stopping
rules are characterized by their respective exercise thresholds, which can be quickly determined
in a general class of spectrally negative Le´vy credit risk models.
M. Egami et al. / Stochastic Processes and their Applications 123 (2013) 347–384 369
For future research, it is most natural to consider the default swap game under a finite horizon
and/or different credit risk models. The default swap game studied in this paper can potentially be
applied to approximate its finite-maturity version using the maturity randomization (Canadiza-
tion) approach (see [11,25]). Another interesting extension is to allow for multiple adjustments by
the buyer and/or seller prior to default, which can be modeled as stochastic games with multiple
stopping opportunities. Finally, the step-up and step-down features also arise in other derivatives,
including interest rate swaps.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1. First, by a rearrangement of integrals and (2.5), the expression inside
the expectation in (2.1) can be written as
1{τ∧σ<∞}
 σ0
τ∧σ
e−r t p˜ dt −
 σ0
0
e−r t p dt + e−rσ0 −α˜1{τ∧σ<σ0} + α
+ 1{τ∧σ<σ0}e−r(τ∧σ)
−γb1{τ≤σ } + γs1{τ≥σ }+ 1{τ∧σ=∞}−  ∞
0
e−r t p dt

= 1{τ∧σ<∞}
 σ0
τ∧σ
e−r t p˜ dt − e−rσ0 α˜1{τ∧σ<σ0}
+ 1{τ∧σ<σ0}e−r(τ∧σ)
−γb1{τ≤σ } + γs1{τ≥σ }
−
 σ0
0
e−r t p dt + e−rσ0α
= 1{τ∧σ<∞, τ∧σ<σ0}
 σ0
τ∧σ
e−r t p˜ dt − e−rσ0 α˜ + e−r(τ∧σ) −γb1{τ≤σ } + γs1{τ≥σ }
−
 σ0
0
e−r t p dt + e−rσ0α.
Taking expectation, (2.1) simplifies to
V (x; σ, τ) = Ex

1{τ∧σ<∞, τ∧σ<σ0}
 σ0
τ∧σ
e−r t p˜ dt − e−rσ0 α˜
+ e−r(τ∧σ) −γb1{τ≤σ } + γs1{τ≥σ }
−Ex
 σ0
0
e−r t p dt

+ α Ex e−rσ0 . (A.1)
Here, the last two terms do not depend on τ nor σ and they constitute C(x; p, α). Next, using
the fact that {τ ∧ σ < σ0, τ ∧ σ <∞} = {Xτ∧σ > 0, τ ∧ σ <∞} for every τ, σ ∈ S and the
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strong Markov property of X at time τ ∧ σ , we express the first term as
Ex

1{τ∧σ<∞, τ∧σ<σ0}

Ex
 σ0
τ∧σ
e−r t p˜ dt − e−rσ0 α˜
Fτ∧σ 
+ e−r(τ∧σ) −γb1{τ≤σ } + γs1{τ≥σ }
= Ex

1{τ∧σ<∞, τ∧σ<σ0}e−r(τ∧σ)

h(Xτ )1{τ<σ } + g(Xσ )1{τ>σ } + f (Xτ )1{τ=σ }

= Ex

e−r(τ∧σ)

h(Xτ )1{τ<σ } + g(Xσ )1{τ>σ } + f (Xτ )1{τ=σ }

1{τ∧σ<∞}

= v(x; σ, τ),
where the second equality holds because (i) τ < σ or τ > σ implies τ ∧ σ < σ0, and (ii) by
f (Xσ0) = 0 we have f (Xτ )1{τ=σ,τ∧σ<σ0} = f (Xτ )1{τ=σ } a.s. 
Proof of Proposition 2.2. First, we deduce from (2.7)–(2.9) that
h(x; p˜, α˜, γb) = −g(x;− p˜,−α˜, γb),
g(x; p˜, α˜, γs) = −h(x;− p˜,−α˜, γs),
f (x; p˜, α˜, γb, γs) = − f (x;− p˜,−α˜, γs, γb).
Substituting these equations to (2.6) of Proposition 2.1, it follows, for every τ, σ ∈ S, that
v(x; σ, τ ; p˜, α˜, γb, γs)
= −Ex

e−r(τ∧σ)

h(Xσ ;− p˜,−α˜, γs)1{σ<τ } + g(Xτ ;− p˜,−α˜, γb)1{τ<σ }
+ f (Xτ∧σ ;− p˜,−α˜, γs, γb)1{τ=σ }

1{τ∧σ<∞}

= −v(x; τ, σ ;− p˜,−α˜, γs, γb). 
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Recall that v is given by the first expectation of (A.1), and note that
σA ∧ τB = ∞ implies σ0 = ∞. For every x ∈ (A, B), v(x; A, B)− h(x) equals
Ex

1{σA∧τB<∞}
 σ0
σA∧τB
e−r t p˜ dt − e−rσ0 α˜1{σA∧τB<σ0}
+ e−r(σA∧τB ) −γb1{τB<σA} + γs1{τB>σA}
−Ex
 σ0
0
e−r t p˜ dt − e−rσ0 α˜

+ γb
= Ex

1{σA∧τB<∞}

−
 σA∧τB
0
e−r t p˜ dt + e−rσ0 α˜1{σA∧τB=σ0}
+ e−r(σA∧τB ) −γb1{τB<σA} + γs1{τB>σA}
− 1{σA∧τB=∞}
 σ0
0
e−r t p˜ dt − e−rσ0 α˜
 
+ γb
= Ex

1{σA∧τB<∞}e−r(σA∧τB )

α˜1{σA∧τB=σ0} − γb1{τB<σA} + γs1{τB>σA}

−
 σA∧τB
0
e−r t p˜ dt

+ γb,
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which equals Υ(x; A, B)− p˜r + γb. Since g(x) = h(x)+ γs + γb, ∀x > 0, the second claim of
(3.16) is immediate.
The proof of the second claim amounts to proving the following: for 0 < A < x < B <∞,
Ex

e−r(σA∧τB )1{τB<σA}

= W
(r)(x − A)
W (r)(B − A) ,
Ex

e−r(σA∧τB )1{τB>σA or σA∧τB=σ0}

= Z (r)(x − A)− Z (r)(B − A) W
(r)(x − A)
W (r)(B − A) ,
Ex

e−r(σA∧τB )1{σA∧τB=σ0}

= W
(r)(x − A)
W (r)(B − A)κ(B; A)− κ(x; A).
(A.2)
The first two equalities follow directly from the property of the scale function (see, for example,
Theorem 8.1 of [23]). Notice here that τB < σA if and only if it up-crosses B before down-
crossing A while τB > σA or σA∧τB = σ0 if and only if it down-crosses A before up-crossing B.
For the third equality, we require the overshoot distribution that is again obtained via the scale
function. Let N be the Poisson random measure for the jumps of−X and X and X be the running
maximum and minimum, respectively, of X . By compensation formula (see e.g. Theorem 4.4
of [23]), we have
Ex

e−r(σA∧τB )1{σA∧τB=σ0}

= Ex
 ∞
0
 ∞
0
N (dt × du)e−r t 1{X t−<B, X t−>A, X t−−u<0}

= Ex
 ∞
0
dte−r t
 ∞
0
Π (du)1{X t−<B, X t−>A, X t−−u<0}

=
 ∞
0
Π (du)
 ∞
0
dt

e−r tPx {X t− < u, σA ∧ τB ≥ t}

.
(A.3)
Recall that, as in Theorem 8.7 of [23], the resolvent measure for the spectrally negative Le´vy
process killed upon exiting [0, a] is given by ∞
0
dt

e−r tPx {X t− ∈ dy, σ0 ∧ τa > t}

= dy

W (r)(x)W (r)(a − y)
W (r)(a)
− W (r)(x − y)

, y > 0.
Hence ∞
0
dt

e−r tPx {X t− ∈ dy, σA ∧ τB > t}

=
 ∞
0
dt

e−r tPx−A {X t− ∈ d(y − A), σ0 ∧ τB−A > t}

= dy

W (r)(x − A)W (r)(B − y)
W (r)(B − A) − W
(r)(x − y)

,
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when y > A, and it is zero otherwise. Therefore, for u > A, we have ∞
0
dt

e−r tPx {X t− < u, σA ∧ τB > t}

=
 u
A
dy

W (r)(x − A)W (r)(B − y)
W (r)(B − A) − W
(r)(x − y)

=
 u−A
0
dz

W (r)(x − A)W (r)(B − z − A)
W (r)(B − A) − W
(r)(x − z − A)

= W
(r)(x − A)
W (r)(B − A)
 u∧B−A
0
dzW (r)(B − z − A)−
 u∧x−A
0
dzW (r)(x − z − A)
since W (r) is zero on (−∞, 0). Therefore, Ex e−r(σA∧τB )1{σA∧τB=σ0} = W (r)(x−A)W (r)(B−A)κ(B; A) −
κ(x; A). Finally, substituting (A.2) in (3.15), the proof is complete. 
Proof of Lemma 3.2. (1) The monotonicity is clear because ∂κ(x; A)/∂A = −W (r)(x −
A)Π (A,∞) < 0 for any x > A > 0.
(2) By (3.8), we have for any u > A u∧x−A
0
dzW (r)(x − z − A) =
 u∧x−A
0
dzeΦ(r)(x−z−A)WΦ(r)(x − z − A)
≤ 1
φ′(Φ(r))
 u−A
0
dzeΦ(r)(x−z−A)
= e
Φ(r)(x−A)
Φ(r)φ′(Φ(r))

1− e−Φ(r)(u−A)

.
Therefore,
κ(x; A) ≤ e
Φ(r)(x−A)
Φ(r)φ′(Φ(r))
ρ(A) ≤ e
Φ(r)x
Φ(r)φ′(Φ(r))
ρ(0). (A.4)
Using this with the dominated convergence theorem yields the limit:
κ(x; 0) = lim
A↓0
1
r
 ∞
0
Π (du + A)

Z (r)(x − A)− Z (r)(x − A − u)

= 1
r
 ∞
0
Π (du)

Z (r)(x)− Z (r)(x − u)

,
which is finite.
(3) For all x > A ≥ 0
κ(x; A)
W (r)(x − A) =
 ∞
A
Π (du)
 u∧x−A
0
dz
W (r)(x − z − A)
W (r)(x − A)
≤
 ∞
A
Π (du)
 u∧x−A
0
e−Φ(r)zdz ≤ ρ(A)
Φ(r)
.
Therefore, the dominated convergence theorem yields the limit:
lim
x↑∞
κ(x; A)
W (r)(x − A) =
1
r
 ∞
A
Π (du) lim
x↑∞
Z (r)(x − A)− Z (r)(x − u)
W (r)(x − A) =
ρ(A)
Φ(r)
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where the last equality holds by (3.10), Z (r)(x − A)/W (r)(x − A) x↑∞−−−→ r/Φ(r) and
lim
x↑∞
Z (r)(x − u)
W (r)(x − A) = limx↑∞ e
−Φ(r)(u−A) Z (r)(x − u)
W (r)(x − u)
WΦ(r)(x − u)
WΦ(r)(x − A)
= e−Φ(r)(u−A) r
Φ(r)
. 
Proof of Lemma 3.3. (1) It is immediate by Lemma 3.2(3) and (3.10). (2) By Lemma 3.2(2)
and because ρ(A)
A↓0−−→ ρ(0), the convergence indeed holds. (3) By (A.4), the dominated
convergence theorem yields
lim
B↓AΨ(A, B) = limB↓A
 p˜
r
− γb

−
 p˜
r
+ γs

Z (r)(B − A)+ (α˜ − γs) κ(B; A)

= −(γb + γs) < 0. 
Proof of Remark 3.4. By Theorem 8.1 of [23], we obtain the limits:
lim
A↓0E
x

e−r(σA∧τB )1{τB<σA,τB∧σA<∞}

= Ex e−rτB 1{τB<σ0, τB<∞} ,
lim
A↓0E
x

e−r(σA∧τB )1{τB>σA or σA∧τB=σ0}1{τB∧σA<∞}

= Ex e−rτB 1{τB=σ0<∞} .
By the construction of Ex

e−r(σA∧τB )1{σA∧τB=σ0<∞}

as seen in (A.3) above, we deduce that
lim
A↓0E
x

e−r(σA∧τB )1{σA∧τB=σ0<∞}

= Ex

e−rτB 1{XτB<0,τB<∞}

= Ex e−rτB 1{τB=σ0<∞}
−Ex

e−rτB 1{XτB=0, τB<∞}

.
Applying these to the definition (3.15) yields:
Υ(x; 0+, B) = Υ(x; 0, B)− (α˜ − γs)Ex

e−rτB 1{XτB=0, τB<∞}

.
By [23] Exercise 7.6, a spectrally negative Le´vy process creeps downward, or P

Xσ0 = 0 |σ0 <∞ > 0, if and only if there is a Gaussian component. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 3.4. We first show the following.
Lemma A.1. If
 1
0 uΠ (du) < ∞, then we have
∞
0 Π (du)

1 − W (r)(B−u)
W (r)(B)

< ∞ for any
0 < B <∞.
Proof. Fix B > 0. We have ∞
0
Π (du)

1− W
(r)(B − u)
W (r)(B)

= Π (B,∞)+ 1
W (r)(B)
 B
0
Π (du)

W (r)(B)− W (r)(B − u)

. (A.5)
For any 0 < ϵ < B, we have by the mean value theorem, ϵ
0
(W (r)(B)− W (r)(B − u))Π (du) ≤
 ϵ
0
u sup
t∈[B−ϵ,B]
W (r)
′
(t)Π (du)
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which is finite because supt∈[B−ϵ,B] W (r)
′
(t) < ∞ and  10 uΠ (du) < ∞. Hence we con-
clude. 
(1) Suppose B <∞. Since W (r)(B−u)/W (r)(B− A) is increasing in A on (0, B), it follows
that
∂
∂A
ψ(A, B) = −(α˜ − γs)  B
A
Π (du)
∂
∂A

W (r)(B − u)
W (r)(B − A)

< 0, 0 < A < B,
and ψ is decreasing in A on (0, B). The result for B = ∞ is immediate because ρ(A) is
decreasing.
For the convergence result for B <∞ (when  10 uΠ (du) <∞), we have ∞
A
Π (du)

1− W
(r)(B − u)
W (r)(B − A)

≤ 1
W (r)(B − A)
 ∞
0
Π (du)

W (r)(B)− W (r)(B − u)

,
which is bounded by Lemma A.1. Hence by the dominated convergence theorem,
lim
A↓0
 ∞
A
Π (du)

1− W
(r)(B − u)
W (r)(B − A)

=
 ∞
0
lim
A↓0Π (du + A)

1− W
(r)(B − u − A)
W (r)(B − A)

=
 ∞
0
Π (du)

1− W
(r)(B − u)
W (r)(B)

.
The convergence result for B = ∞ is clear because ρ(A) A↓0−−→ ρ(0).
(2) Suppose A > 0. Look at (3.27) and consider the derivative with respect to B,
∂
∂B
ψ(A, B) = −(α˜ − γs)π(B) W (r)(0)
W (r)(B − A) +
 B
A
Π (du)
∂
∂B
W (r)(B − u)
W (r)(B − A)

where π is the density of Π . Moreover, for all A < u < B,
∂
∂B
W (r)(B − u)
W (r)(B − A) = e
−Φ(r)(u−A) ∂
∂B
WΦ(r)(B − u)
WΦ(r)(B − A)
= e−Φ(r)(u−A) W
′
Φ(r)(B − u)WΦ(r)(B − A)− WΦ(r)(B − u)W ′Φ(r)(B − A)
(WΦ(r)(B − A))2 ≥ 0,
by (3.12). Therefore, ψ(A, B) is decreasing in B. This result can be extended to A = 0 as in
part (1).
For the convergence result for A > 0, the dominated convergence theorem yields
lim
B→∞
 ∞
A
Π (du)

1− W
(r)(B − u)
W (r)(B − A)

=
 ∞
A
Π (du) lim
B→∞

1− W
(r)(B − u)
W (r)(B − A)

= ρ(A),
where the last equality holds by (3.7)–(3.8).
M. Egami et al. / Stochastic Processes and their Applications 123 (2013) 347–384 375
When A = 0, it also holds by applying the dominated convergence theorem. Indeed, (A.5) is
bounded in B on [B0,∞) for any B0 > 0. To see this, for any 0 < ε < B
1
W (r)(B)
 B
0
Π (du)

W (r)(B)− W (r)(B − u)

= e
Φ(r)B
W (r)(B)
 B
0
Π (du)WΦ(r)(B)

1− e−Φ(r)u

+
 B
0
Π (du)e−Φ(r)u

WΦ(r)(B)− WΦ(r)(B − u)

≤ e
Φ(r)B
W (r)(B)

WΦ(r)(B)ρ(0)+ WΦ(r)(B)Π (ε, B)+ α(B; ε)

,
with α(B; ε) :=  ε0 Π (du) WΦ(r)(B)− WΦ(r)(B − u). Moreover for any B > B0 > ε, by
the mean value theorem, α(B; ε) ≤  ε0 u supt≥B0−ε W ′Φ(r)(t)Π (du) which is finite because
supt≥B0−ε W
′
Φ(r)(t) <∞ and
 1
0 uΠ (du) <∞. This together with W (r)(x) ∼ eΦ(r)x/φ′(Φ(r))
as x ↑ ∞ shows that (A.5) is bounded in B on [B0,∞).
(3) The derivative of (3.21) can go into the integral by the dominated convergence theorem
because 1r
∞
0 Π (du)
Z (r)′(B)− Z (r)′(B − u) = ∞0 Π (du) W (r)(B)− W (r)(B − u) < ∞
by Lemma A.1. Therefore, the result follows. 
Proof of Theorem 3.3. (1) In view of (a)–(c) in Section 3.3, we shall show that (i) Ψ(A, B)
monotonically increases while (ii) Ψ(A, B) monotonically decreases in B.
(i) By the assumption A > 0, we have ψ(A,∞) = 0. This coupled with the fact that ψ(A, B)
is decreasing in B by Lemma 3.4(2) shows that ψ(A, B) > 0 or ψ(A, B) > 0 for every
B > A and hence Ψ(A, B) is monotonically increasing in B on (A,∞) (recall ψ(A, B) =
∂Ψ(A, B)/∂B). Furthermore, b(A) < ∞ implies that Ψ(A,∞) > 0 (note Ψ(A, B) >
0 ⇐⇒ Ψ(A, B) > 0). This together with W (r)(B − A) B↑∞−−−→ ∞ implies that Ψ(A, B) is
monotonically increasing in B to +∞.
(ii) Because A ≥ A, we obtain A > 0 and hence ψ(A, A+) = 0. This together with the fact
that ψ(A, B) is decreasing in B by Lemma 3.4(2) shows that ψ(A, B) < 0, or ψ(A, B) < 0, for
every B > A. Consequently,Ψ(A, B) is monotonically decreasing in B on (A,∞). Furthermore,
because Ψ(A, A+) < 0 by Lemma 3.3(3), Ψ(A, B) never up-crosses the level zero.
By (i) and (ii) and the continuity of Ψ and ψ with respect to both A and B, there must
exist A∗ ∈ (A, A) and B∗ ∈ (A∗,∞) such that B∗ = b(A∗) = b(A∗) (with Ψ(A∗, B∗) =
ψ(A∗, B∗) = 0).
(2) Using the same argument as in (1)(i) above, Ψ(A, B) is increasing in B on (A,∞).
Moreover, the assumption b(A) = ∞ means that −∞ < Ψ(A, A+) ≤ limB↑∞Ψ(A, B) ≤ 0.
This together with W (r)(B − A) B↑∞−−−→ ∞ shows Ψ(A,∞) = 0. By (3.13) and (3.37),ψ(A,∞) = 0 and this implies that ψ(A, B) > 0 for all B ∈ (A,∞) by virtue of Lemma 3.4(2),
and hence b(A) = ∞.
(3) Recall Lemma 3.4(3). We have ψ(0, B) > 0 if and only if B ∈ (0, b(0)), and hence
Ψ(0, ·) attains a global maximum Ψ(0, b(0)) and it is strictly larger than zero because b(0) <
b(0). Furthermore, Ψ(A, B) is monotonically decreasing in B on (A,∞) and Ψ(A, A+) < 0 as
in (1)(ii). This together with the same argument as in (1) shows the result.
(4) First, A = 0 implies b(0) = 0. This also means that ψ(0, B) ≤ 0 orΨ(0, B) is decreasing
on (0,∞). This together with Lemma 3.3(3) shows b(0) = ∞. Now, for both (i) and (ii) for every
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B ∈ [b(0), b(0)], because ψ(0, B) ≤ 0, we must have Ψ(0, B) − ψ(0, B) W (r)(B)
W (r)′ (B) ≥ Ψ(0, B).
This shows that b(0) ≤ b(0). It is clear that this is case 3 when b(0) <∞ whereas this is case 4
when b(0) = ∞. 
Proof of Lemma 3.5. (1) With W (r)(B − A) > 0, it is sufficient to show Ψ(A, B) is decreasing
in A on (A, A) for every fixed B. Indeed, the derivative
∂
∂A
Ψ(A, B) = ∂
∂A

−
 p˜
r
+ γs

Z (r)(B − A)+ (α˜ − γs)κ(B; A)

(A.6)
= W (r)(B − A) ( p˜ + rγs − (α˜ − γs)Π (A,∞)) (A.7)
is negative for every A ∈ (0, A) by the definition of A. Part (2) is immediate from
Lemma 3.4(1). 
Proof of Lemma 3.6. (1) Fix B∗ > x > A > A∗ > 0. First, suppose B∗ <∞. We compute the
derivative:
∂
∂A
(vA,B∗(x)− g(x)) = ∂
∂A
Υ(x; A, B∗) =
 ∂
∂A
W (r)(x − A)
W (r)(B∗ − A)

Ψ(A, B∗)
+ W
(r)(x − A)
W (r)(B∗ − A)
∂
∂A
Ψ(A, B∗)
+ ∂
∂A
 p˜
r
+ γs

Z (r)(x − A)− (α˜ − γs) κ(x; A)

.
Using (A.7), the last two terms of the above cancel out and
∂
∂A
(vA,B∗(x)− g(x)) =
 ∂
∂A
W (r)(x − A)
W (r)(B∗ − A)

Ψ(A, B∗).
On the right-hand side, the derivative is given by
∂
∂A
W (r)(x − A)
W (r)(B∗ − A) = e
−Φ(r)(B∗−x) ∂
∂A
WΦ(r)(x − A)
WΦ(r)(B∗ − A)
= e−Φ(r)(B∗−x)−W
′
Φ(r)(x − A)WΦ(r)(B∗ − A)+ WΦ(r)(x − A)W ′Φ(r)(B∗ − A)
WΦ(r)(B∗ − A)2
which is negative according to (3.12) by B∗ > x . Now suppose B∗ = ∞. We have
∂
∂A
(vA,∞(x)− g(x)) = ∂
∂A

W (r)(x − A)Ψ(A,∞)
+ ∂
∂A
 p˜
r
+ γs

Z (r)(x − A)− (α˜ − γs) κ(x; A)

.
By (3.20), the first term becomes
∂
∂A

W (r)(x − A)Ψ(A,∞) = −W (r)′(x − A)Ψ(A,∞)
− (α − γs)W (r)(x − A)  ∞
A
Π (du)e−Φ(r)(u−A),
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and by using the last equality of (A.7) (with B replaced with x), we obtain
−(α − γs)W (r)(x − A)  ∞
A
Π (du)e−Φ(r)(u−A)
+ ∂
∂A
 p˜
r
+ γs

Z (r)(x − A)− (α˜ − γs) κ(x; A)

= W (r)(x − A) (−( p˜ + rγs)+ (α˜ − γs)ρ(A)) = W (r)(x − A)Φ(r)Ψ(A,∞).
Hence,
∂
∂A
(vA,∞(x)− g(x)) = −

W (r)
′
(x − A)− Φ(r)W (r)(x − A)
 Ψ(A,∞)
= −eΦ(r)(x−A)W ′Φ(r)(x − A)Ψ(A,∞)
where W ′Φ(r)(x − A) > 0 because WΦ(r) is increasing.
Now in order to show vA,B∗(x) − g(x) is increasing in A on (A∗, x), it is sufficient to showΨ(A, B∗) ≤ 0 for every A∗ < A < B∗. This is true for A∗ < A < A by b(A∗) = B∗ and
Lemma 3.5(1). This holds also for A ≤ A < B∗. Indeed, Ψ(A, B) is decreasing in B because,
for any B > A > A, ψ(A, A+) < 0 and Lemma 3.4(2) imply ψ(A, B) ≤ 0. Furthermore,
Lemma 3.3(3) shows that Ψ(A, A+) < 0. Hence Ψ(A, B∗) ≤ 0 or Ψ(A, B∗) ≤ 0.
Now we have by (3.29), 0 ≥ W (r)(0)Ψ(x, B∗) = vx,B∗(x+) − g(x) ≥ vA∗,B∗(x) − g(x).
This proves (3.42) for the case A∗ > 0. Since v0+,B∗(x) = limA↓0 vA,B∗(x) by (3.16) and (3.25),
this also shows for the case A∗ = 0.
(2) Recall that ψ(A∗, B) = ∂Ψ(A∗, B)/∂B and hence for any A∗ < x < B < B∗
∂
∂B
(vA∗,B(x)− h(x)) = ∂
∂B
Υ(x; A∗, B)
= W
(r)(x − A∗)
(W (r)(B − A∗))2

ψ(A∗, B)W (r)(B − A∗)−Ψ(A∗, B)W (r)′(B − A∗)
= −W (r)(x − A∗)W
(r)′(B − A∗)
W (r)(B − A∗)
Ψ(A∗, B)− ψ(A∗, B) W (r)(B − A∗)
W (r)′(B − A∗)

which is positive for B ∈ (A∗, B∗) by Remark 3.5(1). Therefore, by (3.28), 0 = vA∗,x (x−) −
h(x) ≤ vA∗,B∗(x)− h(x).
This proves (3.43) for the case B∗ < ∞. Since vA∗,∞(x) = limB↑∞ vA∗,B(x) by (3.16) and
(3.23), this also shows for the case B∗ = ∞. 
Proof of Lemma 3.7. (1) Suppose A∗ > 0. Because XσA∗∧τ > A∗ a.s. on {τ < σA∗ , τ < ∞},
XσA∗∧τ ≤ A∗ a.s. on {τ ≥ σA∗ , σA∗ <∞} and by (3.43), we have on {τ ∧ σA∗ <∞}
g(XσA∗ )1{σA∗<τ } + h(Xτ )1{τ<σA∗ } ≤ g(XσA∗ )1{σA∗<τ } + vA∗,B∗(Xτ )1{τ<σA∗ }
= vA∗,B∗(XσA∗ )1{σA∗<τ } + vA∗,B∗(Xτ )1{τ<σA∗ } = vA∗,B∗(XσA∗∧τ ).
Suppose A∗ = 0. We have, by (3.43), on {τ <∞}
−(α˜ − γs)1{Xτ=0} + h(Xτ )1{τ<σ0} ≤ −(α˜ − γs)1{Xτ=0} + v0+,B∗(Xτ )1{τ<σ0}
= v0+,B∗(Xτ ).
The proof for (2) is similar thanks to (3.42). 
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Proof of Lemma 3.8. (1) First, Lemma 3.4 of [27] shows that (L−r)ζ(x) = 0. Therefore, using
(3.38) and that J ′ = J ′′ = 0 on (0, A∗), we have
(L− r)vA∗,B∗(x) =
 ∞
x
(J (x − u)− J (x))Π (du)− r J (x)
= (α˜ − γs)Π (x,∞)− (rγs + p˜). (A.8)
Since A∗ > 0, we must have by construction Ψ(A∗, B∗) = 0 and Ψ(A∗, B∗) − ψ(A∗, B∗)
W (r)(B∗−A∗)
W (r)′ (B∗−A∗) = 0 and consequently, ψ(A∗, B∗) = 0. Furthermore, ψ(A∗, B) is decreasing in
B and hence ψ(A∗, A∗+) = (α˜ − γs)Π (A∗,∞) − ( p˜ + γsr) > 0. Applying this to (A.8), for
x < A∗, it follows that (L− r)vA∗,B∗(x) > 0.
(2) When A∗ > 0, by the strong Markov property,
e−r(t∧σA∗∧τB∗ )vA∗,B∗(X t∧σA∗∧τB∗ )
= Ex

e−r(τB∗∧σA∗ )

h(XτB∗ )1{τB∗<σA∗ }
+ g(XσA∗ )1{τB∗>σA∗ }

1{τB∗∧σA∗<∞}|Ft∧σA∗∧τB∗

.
Taking expectation on both sides, we see that e−r(t∧σA∗∧τB∗ )vA∗,B∗(X t∧σA∗∧τB∗ ) is a Px -
martingale and hence (L − r)vA∗,B∗(x) = 0 on (A∗, B∗) (see Remark 3.2 and the Appendix
of [7]).
When A∗ = 0 by Remark 3.4
e−r(t∧τB∗ )v0+,B∗(X t∧τB∗ )
= Ex

e−rτB∗

h(XτB∗ )1{τB∗<σ0} − (α˜ − γs)1{XτB∗=0}

1{τB∗<∞}
Ft∧τB∗ .
Taking expectation on both sides, we see that e−r(t∧τB∗ )v0+,B∗(X t∧τB∗ ) is a Px -martingale and
hence (L− r)v0+,B∗(x) = 0 on (0, B∗).
(3) Suppose ν > 0, i.e. there is a Gaussian component. In this case, W (r) is continuous on R
and C2 on (0,∞), and we have
v′′A∗,B∗(B∗−)− h′′(B∗) = W (r)
′′
(B∗ − A∗)Ψ(A∗, B∗)
+ ( p˜ + γsr)W (r)′(B∗ − A∗)− (α˜ − γs)
×
 ∞
A∗
Π (du)

W (r)
′
(B∗ − A∗)− W (r)′(B∗ − u).
We show v′′A∗,B∗(B∗−) − h′′(B∗) ≥ 0. To this end, we suppose v′′A∗,B∗(B∗−) − h′′(B∗) < 0
and derive contradiction. The fact that v′A∗,B∗(B∗−) − h′(B∗) = 0 by smooth fit implies that
v′A∗,B∗(x)− h′(x) > 0 for some x ∈ (B∗ − ε, B∗). However, since vA∗,B∗(B∗−)− h(B∗) = 0,
this would contradict (3.43). Consequently, v′′A∗,B∗(B∗−)−h′′(B∗) ≥ 0, implying (L−r)vA∗,B∗
(B∗+) ≤ (L− r)vA∗,B∗(B∗−). When ν = 0, (L− r)vA∗,B∗(B∗+) = (L− r)vA∗,B∗(B∗−) by
continuous and smooth fit.
As a result, for all cases, we conclude that (L− r)vA∗,B∗(B∗+) ≤ (L− r)vA∗,B∗(B∗−) = 0.
Now it is sufficient to show that (L − r)vA∗,B∗(x) is decreasing on (B∗,∞). Recall the
decomposition (3.38). Because (L − r)ζ(x) = 0, we shall show (L − r)J (x) is decreasing
on (A∗, B∗).
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Now because J ′ = J ′′ = 0 on x > B∗,
(L− r)J (x) =
 ∞
x−B∗
Π (du)

J (x − u)−
 p
r
− γb

− (p − rγb), x > B∗.
Since vA∗,B∗(x) ≥ h(x), we must have that J (x) ≥ pr − γb on x < B∗ (or the integrand of
the above is non-negative). In order to show that this is decreasing, we show that J in (3.39)
is decreasing on (−∞, B∗). By continuous fit at A∗ (when A∗ > 0), it is sufficient to show
that Υ(x; A∗, B∗) is decreasing for every x ∈ (A∗, B∗). By Remark 3.5(3), we must haveΨ(A∗, B∗) − ψ(A∗, B∗) W (r)(B∗−A∗)
W (r)′ (B∗−A∗) = 0, and hence by (3.12) and because Ψ(A∗, B∗) ≤ 0
as in Remark 3.5(1),
0 = W
(r)′(B∗ − A∗)
W (r)(B∗ − A∗)Ψ(A
∗, B∗)− ψ(A∗, B∗)
≥ W
(r)′(x − A∗)
W (r)(x − A∗)Ψ(A
∗, B∗)− ψ(A∗, B∗).
After multiplying by W (r)(x − A∗)/W (r)(B∗ − A∗) on both sides and observing ψ(A∗, x) is
decreasing in x by Lemma 3.4, we get 0 ≥ W (r)′(x−A∗)Ψ(A∗, B∗)−W (r)(x−A∗)ψ(A∗, B∗) ≥
W (r)
′
(x − A∗)Ψ(A∗, B∗) − W (r)(x − A∗)ψ(A∗, x), which matches Υ ′(x; A∗, B∗) in (3.31).
Hence, Υ(x; A∗, B∗) is decreasing, as desired. 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. (i) We show that vA∗,B∗(x) ≥ v(x; σA∗ , τ ) for every τ ∈ S. As is
discussed in Remark 3.6, we only need to focus on the set SA∗ .
In order to handle the discontinuity of vA∗,B∗ at zero, we first construct a sequence of functions
vn(·) such that it is continuous onR, vn(x) = vA∗,B∗(x) on x ∈ (0,∞) and (c) vn(x) ↑ vA∗,B∗(x)
pointwise for every fixed x ∈ (−∞, 0). Notice that vA∗,B∗(·) is uniformly bounded because
h(·) and g(·) are. Hence, we can choose so that vn is also uniformly bounded for every fixed
n ≥ 1. Because v′A∗,B∗(x) = v′n(x) and v′′A∗,B∗(x) = v′′n (x) on x ∈ (0,∞) \ {A∗, B∗} and
vA∗,B∗(x) ≥ vn(x) on (−∞, 0), we have
(L− r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(x) ≤ 0, x ∈ (0,∞) \ {A∗, B∗}. (A.9)
We have for any τ ∈ SA∗ , Ex
 τ∧σA∗
0 e
−rs |(L− r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)|ds

≤ KEx σA∗0 e−rs
Π (Xs−,∞)ds

where K := supx∈R |vA∗,B∗(x) − vn(x)| < ∞ is the maximum difference
between vA∗,B∗ and vn . Using N as the Poisson random measure for the jumps of −X and
X as the running minimum of X , by the compensation formula [23, Theorem 4.4],
Ex
 σA∗
0
e−rsΠ (Xs−,∞)ds

= Ex
 ∞
0
 ∞
0
e−rs1{X s−>A∗, u>Xs−}Π (du)ds

= Ex
 ∞
0
 ∞
0
e−rs1{X s−>A∗, u>Xs−}N (ds × du)

= Ex

e−rσA∗ 1{XσA∗<0, σA∗<∞}

<∞.
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Therefore, uniformly for any n ≥ 1,
Ex
 τ∧σA∗
0
e−rs |(L− r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)|ds

<∞, τ∧σA∗
0
e−rs |(L− r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)|ds <∞, Px -a.s.
(A.10)
By applying Ito’s formula to

e−r(t∧σA∗ )vn(X t∧σA∗ ); t ≥ 0

(here we assume A∗ > 0), we
see that
e−r(t∧σA∗ )vn(X t∧σA∗ )−
 t∧σA∗
0
e−rs(L− r)vn(Xs−)ds; t ≥ 0

(A.11)
is a local martingale. Here the C2 (C1) condition at {A∗, B∗} for the case X is of unbounded
(bounded) variation can be relaxed by a version of Meyer–Ito formula as in Theorem IV.71
of [32] (see also Theorem 2.1 of [30]).
Suppose {Tk; k ≥ 1} is the corresponding localizing sequence, namely,
Ex

e−r(t∧σA∗∧Tk )vn(X t∧σA∗∧Tk )

= vn(x)+ Ex
 t∧σA∗∧Tk
0
e−rs(L− r)vn(Xs−)ds

.
Now by applying the dominated convergence theorem on the left-hand side and Fatou’s lemma
on the right-hand side via (L−r)vn(x) ≤ 0 for every x > 0 thanks to (A.9) and Lemma 3.8(2, 3),
we obtain
Ex

e−r(t∧σA∗ )vn(X t∧σA∗ )

≤ vn(x)+ Ex
 t∧σA∗
0
e−rs(L− r)vn(Xs−)ds

.
Hence (A.11) is a supermartingale.
Now fix τ ∈ SA∗ . By optional sampling theorem, we have for any M ≥ 0
Ex

e−r(τ∧σA∗∧M)vn(Xτ∧σA∗∧M )

≤ vn(x)+ Ex
 τ∧σA∗∧M
0
e−rs((L− r)vA∗,B∗(Xs−)
+ (L− r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−))ds

≤ vn(x)+ Ex
 τ∧σA∗∧M
0
e−rs(L− r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)ds

,
where the last inequality holds by Lemma 3.8(2, 3). Applying the dominated convergence
theorem on both sides via (A.10), we obtain the inequality:
Ex

e−r(τ∧σA∗ )vn(Xτ∧σA∗ )1{τ∧σA∗<∞}

≤ vn(x)+ Ex
 τ∧σA∗
0
e−rs(L− r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)ds

. (A.12)
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We shall take n →∞ on both sides. For the left-hand side, the dominated convergence theorem
implies
lim
n→∞E
x

e−r(τ∧σA∗ )vn(Xτ∧σA∗ )1{τ∧σA∗<∞}

= Ex

e−r(τ∧σA∗ )vA∗,B∗(Xτ∧σA∗ )1{τ∧σA∗<∞}

.
For the right-hand side, we again apply the dominated convergence theorem via (A.10) to get
lim
n→∞E
x
 τ∧σA∗
0
e−rs(L− r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)ds

= Ex

lim
n→∞
 τ∧σA∗
0
e−rs(L− r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)ds

. (A.13)
Now fix Px -a.e. ω ∈ Ω . By (A.10) dominated convergence yields limn→∞
 τ(ω)∧σA∗ (ω)
0 e
−rs(L−
r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−(ω))ds =
 τ(ω)∧σA∗ (ω)
0 e
−rs limn→∞(L − r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−(ω))ds.
Finally, since Xs−(ω) > A∗ for Lebesgue-a.e. s on (0, τ (ω) ∧ σA∗(ω)), and by the dominated
convergence theorem, limn→∞(L − r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−(ω)) =
∞
Xs−(ω)Π (du) limn→∞(vn
(Xs−(ω) − u) − vA∗,B∗(Xs−(ω) − u)) = 0. Hence, the limit (A.13) vanishes. Therefore, by
taking n →∞ in (A.12) (note vA∗,B∗(x) = vn(x)), we have
vA∗,B∗(x) ≥ Ex

e−r(τ∧σA∗ )vA∗,B∗(Xτ∧σA∗ )1{τ∧σA∗<∞}

, τ ∈ SA∗ .
This inequality and Lemma 3.7(1) show that vA∗,B∗(x) ≥ v(x; σA∗ , τ ) for any arbitrary τ ∈ SA∗ .
(ii) Next, we show that vA∗,B∗(x) ≤ v(x; σ, τB∗) for every σ ∈ S. Similarly to (i), we only
need to focus on the set SB∗ . We again use {vn; n ≥ 1} defined in (i). Using the same argument
as in (i), we obtain
Ex
 σ∧τB∗
0
e−rs |(L− r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)|ds

<∞, σ∧τB∗
0
e−rs |(L− r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)|ds <∞, Px -a.s.,
(A.14)
uniformly for any n ≥ 1.
Because vn is not assumed to be C1 nor C2 at zero, we follow the approach by [28]. Fix ϵ > 0.
By applying Ito’s formula to

e−r(t∧τB∗∧σϵ)vn(X t∧τB∗∧σϵ ); t ≥ 0

, we see that

e−r(t∧τB∗∧σϵ)vn(X t∧τB∗∧σϵ )−
 t∧τB∗∧σϵ
0
e−rs(L− r)vn(Xs−)ds; t ≥ 0

(A.15)
382 M. Egami et al. / Stochastic Processes and their Applications 123 (2013) 347–384
is a local martingale. Suppose {Tk; k ≥ 1} is the corresponding localizing sequence, we have
Ex

e−r(t∧τB∗∧σϵ∧Tk )vn(X t∧τB∗∧σϵ∧Tk )

= vn(x)+ Ex
 t∧τB∗∧σϵ∧Tk
0
e−rs(L− r)vn(Xs−)ds

= vn(x)+ Ex
 t∧τB∗∧σϵ∧Tk
0
e−rs((L− r)vA∗,B∗(Xs−)
+ (L− r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−))ds

= vn(x)+ Ex
 t∧τB∗∧σϵ∧Tk
0
e−rs(L− r)vA∗,B∗(Xs−)ds

+Ex
 t∧τB∗∧σϵ∧Tk
0
e−rs(L− r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)ds

where we can split the expectation by (A.14). Now by applying the dominated convergence
theorem on the left-hand side and the monotone convergence theorem and the dominated
convergence theorem respectively on the two expectations on the right-hand side (using
respectively Lemma 3.8(1, 2) and (A.14)), we obtain
Ex

e−r(t∧τB∗∧σϵ)vn(X t∧τB∗∧σϵ )

= vn(x)+ Ex
 t∧τB∗∧σϵ
0
e−rs(L− r)vn(Xs−)ds

.
Hence (A.15) is a martingale.
Now fix σ ∈ SB∗ . By the optional sampling theorem, we have for any M ≥ 0 using
Lemma 3.8(1, 2)
Ex

e−r(σ∧τB∗∧σϵ∧M)vn(Xσ∧τB∗∧σϵ∧M )

= vn(x)+ Ex
 σ∧τB∗∧σϵ∧M
0
e−rs(L− r)vn(Xs−)ds

≥ vn(x)+ Ex
 σ∧τB∗∧σϵ∧M
0
e−rs(L− r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)ds

.
Applying the dominated convergence theorem on both sides by (A.14), we have
Ex

e−r(σ∧τB∗∧σϵ)vn(Xσ∧τB∗∧σϵ )1{σ∧τB∗∧σϵ<∞}

≥ vn(x)+ Ex
 σ∧τB∗∧σϵ
0
e−rs(L− r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)ds

.
Because σϵ → σ0 (τB∗ ∧ σϵ → τB∗ ) a.s., the bounded convergence theorem yields
Ex

e−r(σ∧τB∗ )vn(Xσ∧τB∗ )1{σ∧τB∗<∞}

≥ vn(x)+ Ex
 σ∧τB∗
0
e−rs(L− r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)ds

.
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Finally, we can take n →∞ on both sides along the same line as in (i) and we obtain
vA∗,B∗(x) ≤ Ex

e−r(σ∧τB∗ ) lim
n→∞ vn(Xσ∧τB∗ )1{σ∧τB∗<∞}

= Ex

e−r(σ∧τB∗ )(vA∗,B∗(Xσ∧τB∗ )1{Xσ∧τB∗ ≠0}
+ vA∗,B∗(0+)1{Xσ∧τB∗=0})1{σ∧τB∗<∞}

≤ Ex

e−r(σ∧τB∗ )vA∗,B∗(Xσ∧τB∗ )1{σ∧τB∗<∞}

.
This together with Lemma 3.7(2) shows that vA∗,B∗(x) ≤ v(x; σ, τB∗) for any arbitrary σ ∈
SB∗ . 
Proof of Theorem 3.2. When ν = 0, then the same results as (i) of the proof of Theorem 3.1
hold by replacing A∗ with 0 and τA∗ with σ0. Now suppose ν > 0. Using the same argument as
in the proof of Theorem 3.1 with τA∗ replaced with σ0 and the argument with σϵ as in (ii) of the
proof of Theorem 3.1, the supermartingale property of

e−r(t∧σ0)v0+,B∗(X t∧σ0); t ≥ 0

holds.
This together with Lemma 3.7(1) shows, for any τ ∈ S,
v0+,B∗(x) ≥ Ex

e−rτv0+,B∗(Xτ )1{τ<∞}

≥ Ex e−rτ (h(Xτ )1{τ<σ0} − (α˜ − γs)1{Xτ=0})1{τ<∞} = v(x; σ0+, τ ).
As in the proof of Lemma 3.8(2),

e−r(t∧τB∗ )v0+,B∗(X t∧τB∗ ); t ≥ 0

is a martingale. This
together with Lemma 3.7(2) shows that v0+,B∗(x) ≤ v(x; σ, τB∗) for all σ ∈ SB∗ . 
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